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JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON
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Defendants-Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Constitution Art. VIII § 3, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j), and Utah
R. App. P. 3 and Utah R. App. P. 4.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Was it error for the trial court to award attorney's

fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (the bad faith statute)
to

defendants,

the

non-prevailing

parties,

interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3

based

on

an

(the quiet title

statute) that would define "costs" to include "attorney's fees"?
The trial court's findings of fact as to bad faith may be reversed
only if clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Re id v. Mutual
of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989).

The trial

court's determination that defendants' claim had merit should be
reviewed for correctness as a matter of law.

Jeschke v. Willisr

811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also Bellon v. Malnar. 808
P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991) . This issue was preserved at the trial

court level in the Plaintiffs' Notice of Objections to the Proposed
Order and Judgment.
2.

(R. at 135.)

Was it error for the trial court to withhold an award

of attorney fees from the prevailing party pursuant to the bad
faith statute when the non-prevailing parties never had, asserted,
or claimed a basis in law or in fact for their legal or factual
position

and

nevertheless

took

affirmative

actions

to

take

advantage of the prevailing parties and to hinder and delay the
prevailing parties' enjoyment of a clear and undisputed right? The
trial court's findings of fact may be reversed only if clearly
erroneous.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.

Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989).

The trial court's finding

under the bad faith statute that plaintiffs' claim was without
merit should be reviewed for correctness as a matter of law.
Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also
Bellon v. Malnarr 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991).

This issue was

preserved at the trial court level in the Plaintiffs' Notice of
Objections to the Proposed Order and Judgment.

(R. at 135.)

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56; Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3; Cadv v.
Johnson, 671 P.2d

149

(Utah

1983); Highland

Constr. Co. v.

Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981); Tholen v. Sandy City. 849
P.2d 592 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
judgment

Nature of the Case.
on

the parties7

Plaintiffs appeal from a final

cross-motions
2

seeking

an

award

of

attorney/s

fees.

Defendants

were

awarded

plaintiffs for attorney's fees (R. at 129.)
for attorney's fees was denied.

$484.00

against

Plaintiffs' request

(R. at 129.)

B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiffs
filed a complaint against the defendants seeking a court order
quieting

title to real property

in plaintiffs

and requiring

defendants to pay plaintiffs' reasonable attorney's fees if any of
the defendants asserted a meritless defense to the action.
2,

6.)

Forty-one

counterclaims
sanctions.

days

later,

for attorney's

defendants

fees, and

(R. at 16, 21.)

filed

requests

(R. at

answers,

for Rule 11

After briefing, but without an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a proposed ruling
denying

plaintiffs' motion

for

attorney's

defendants' motion for attorney's fees.

fees

and

(R. at 129.)

granting

Plaintiffs

filed an objection to the proposed order and judgment and requested
a hearing.

(R. at 138, 140.) At the October 5, 1995, hearing, the

trial court declined to alter its previous ruling but did explain
the reasoning it used to arrive at its ruling.

(R. at 142.)

court signed and filed the judgment, order and findings.
155.)

The

(R. at

On December 12, 1995, plaintiffs filed a notice appealing

the trial court's order and judgment.
C.

Statement of Facts.

(R. at 160.)

This case originally involved a

boundary line dispute between plaintiffs and defendant Janice
Miller (hereafter "Defendant Miller") and defendants Kim and Dana
Anderson (hereafter "Defendants Anderson"). The Andersons are the
daughter and son-in-law of Defendant Miller and acquired from
3

Defendant

Miller

property

adjacent

to

plaintiffs' property.

Plaintiffs and Defendant Miller have been neighbors and adjoining
landowners for many years.

The boundary line between their

properties has been marked by a fence and hedge (hereafter "the
fence") that have continually existed, unmoved, for over twenty
years.

(R at 4, 5.)

This boundary line, marked by the fence, is

slightly different than the boundary line described in historical
deeds (which put the boundary line a few feet over onto plaintiffs'
land).

However, both plaintiffs and defendants, as well as their

predecessors in title, have always acquiesced to and recognized the
fence as the boundary between their properties.

(R. at 4, 19.) In

fact, Defendant Miller has executed deeds and filed subdivision
plat maps in which she acknowledged the fence as the boundary line.
(R. at 4, 31, 42, 46, 48.)
In

1994, plaintiffs

property.

(R. at 73.)

began

subdividing

parts

of

their

At the June 15, 1994, American Fork City

Planning Commission meeting, plaintiffs sought final plat approval
on a subdivision which included their property adjacent to the
fence.

(R. at 64.)

However, Defendant Miller appeared at that

meeting and asserted an interest in the plaintiffs' property
adjacent to the fence, thereby causing the city to deny approval
for plaintiffs' subdivision and building permits.

(R. at 64.)

After the meeting, plaintiff Curtis Chipman provided Defendant
Miller a copy of a recent newspaper article which cited Staker v.
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990) , and explained the Utah Supreme
Court's decision that a boundary line will stand under the rule of
4

boundary by acquiescence if a fence line between two pieces of
property has existed for many years and no one has challenged its
location.

(R. at 63, 84, 85.)

"Old Fences Describe Boundaries,"

The Daily Herald. 1990.
The following month, in order to resolve the dispute,
plaintiffs retained an attorney.

In the attorney's file memo he

states:
I met with Jan Miller this morning for a little over
two hours. We went over the plats. At first, her
attitude was that she wanted $8,000.00 from Curtis
Chipman if he wants a Quit-Claim Deed to that
property.
She says, however, that she does not
intend to disturb the present fence line, but if he
wants a record title to his property he is going to
have to pay something for it.
(R. at 62, 119.)
The plaintiffs later retained a new attorney, the undersigned
counsel, who sent to Defendant Miller, but not to Defendants
Anderson, a letter which stated in relevant part:
Curtis and Fay Chipman have asked that I represent
them in their efforts to obtain clear title to the
property within their fence line and along their
boundary.
I understand there have been some
communications with you regarding this and that you
insist on being paid for the land within their fence
line. I have attached a case decided by the Utah
Supreme Court of Appeals just a few weeks ago that
clearly establishes that the Chipmans are entitled to
the property within their fence line and they do not
need to buy it from you. This is because the fence
line has created a situation known as "boundary by
acquiescence." That fence has been there as long as
anybody can remember and has been treated as the
boundary for decades. The Carter case that I have
attached explains more fully why the Chipmans are
entitled to the land within their fence line without
payment. There are many other Utah cases that stand
for the same proposition. If necessary the Chipmans
will pursue their legal rights in the courts. I feel
confident they will prevail if they are required to
5

pursue that action. However, neither they nor I wish
to take such drastic action unless it is absolutely
necessary. They would much prefer to resolve this
matter through conversation.
To that end, please
give me a call at 785-5350 so we can set up an
appointment to get this matter resolved. If you have
an attorney, I would encourage you to make him aware
of this situation. If the Chipmans are forced to
litigate this matter, it is very likely the court
would require you to pay the Chipmans' attorney's
fees. Please respond by December 18. 1994. so we can
get this matter resolved in as cordial a way as
possible. I am looking forward to hearing from you.
(R. at 61.)
The next month, plaintiffs sent to Defendant Miller and
Defendants Anderson another letter. This was the first letter sent
to Defendants Anderson.

(R. at 56.) In relevant part, that letter

states:
I am enclosing the original quit-claim deed resolving
the boundary dispute between you and the Chipmans.
I strongly urge you to sign the deed and deliver it
to Mountain West Title Company, 871 South Orem
Boulevard, Orem, Utah, no later than January 13,
1995.
I have met with you and understand your
position in this matter. I have extensively reviewed
legal documents, deeds, and plats relating to the
disputed land area and I have come to the conclusion
that it is unreasonable for you to delay signing any
longer.
I believe any arguments you may raise in
defense to this case would be frivolous.
I
understand you may not agree with my characterization
of the case.
However, I believe the following
documents set forth in chronological order will
explain how I arrived at that conclusion.
(R. at 56.)

This letter identified a number of deeds which

Defendant Miller had signed acknowledging the fence line as the
properties7 boundary.

(R. at 31, 46, 48.) The letter notified all

defendants that they needed to respond by January 13, 1995 or
plaintiffs would "immediately commence litigation."
56.)

(R. at 53,

Defendants Anderson were named in this letter (and not the
6

first) because Defendant Miller had asserted

that

Defendants

Anderson needed additional footage for their property beyond the
fence line and would therefore not sign a quit-claim deed.
71.)

(R. at

However, Defendants Anderson did not respond to the letter.

(R. at 71.)
Plaintiffs determined that the only way they were going to
obtain clear title to their property was by commencing litigation.
(R. at 71.) Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 8, 1995. On
March 28, 1995, defendants' attorney called plaintiffs' attorney
and requested additional time to answer the complaint. Plaintiffs'
attorney gave defendants' attorney his first extension to file an
answer.

(R. at 40.) On April 3, 1995, defendants' attorney called

plaintiffs' attorney and indicated Defendant Miller would sign a
quit-claim deed if plaintiffs would remove the hedge that had
served as part of plaintiffs' property boundary for more than five
decades.

(R. at 70.)

Defendants' attorney also stated that

Defendants Anderson did not claim an interest in property north of
the fence line.

(R. at 25, 26.)

He stated he would mail

plaintiffs' attorney a letter explaining Defendants Anderson's and
Miller's position.

(R. at 25.)

On April 5, 1995, plaintiffs'

attorney

defendants'

attorney

faxed

to

a

document

showing

plaintiffs' hedge was in compliance with local ordinances.
39.)

The fax cover letter stated:
If you will confirm in writing that Dana and Kim
Anderson do not claim an interest in property north
of the fence line between Andersons and Chipmans,
then I will gladly prepare an order dismissing Dana
and Kim from the lawsuit. As to Jan Miller, please
7

(R. at

answer on her behalf by
Wednesday, April 5, 1995.
(R. at 38, 39.)

close

of

business

on

In the fax plaintiffs' attorney granted the

defendants a second extension of time to file their answer.

(R. at

38, 39.)
On April 7, 1995, plaintiffs' attorney faxed defendants'
attorney another quit-claim deed because defendants' attorney said
he did not have a suitable deed.

(R. at 36, 37.)

In the fax

plaintiffs' attorney also stated, "We still need to talk about
attorney's fees."

(R. at 36, 37.)

On April 14, 1995, nine days after the second extension
deadline for filing an answer, Defendant Miller still had not filed
an answer to the complaint nor had she provided plaintiffs with a
quit-claim deed.

Therefore, after discussions with defendants'

attorney, plaintiffs' attorney faxed to defendants' attorney a note
granting a third extension of time.

The note stated as follows:

I have not yet received the letter you mentioned or
the signed quit-claim deed. I will need to file a
default judgment against Jan Miller on 4/18/95. I
will not file the default judgment against the
Andersons based on your representation that you will
confirm in writing that the Andersons do not assert
an interest in Chipmans' property.
(R. at 34, 35.)
confirming

that

Defendants' attorney responded with a letter
Defendants

Anderson

would

not

be

asserting

ownership interest in property north of the fence line.

(R. at

33.) However, the letter also noted that getting a quit-claim deed
from Defendant Miller was not a "done deal."

The letter stated

Defendant Miller's attorney would "endeavor to have her sign that
quit-claim deed to comply with your deadline."
8

(R. at 33.)

On April 18, 1995, at approximately 11:00 a.m., defendants'
attorney called plaintiffs' attorney to advise that Defendant
Miller had signed a quit-claim deed. (R. at 69.) He also insisted
that plaintiffs not require Defendant Miller to file an answer.
(R. at 69.)

At 2:08 p.m., and for the third time in writing,

plaintiffs' attorney advised defendants' attorney by fax that
Defendants Anderson did not need to file an answer and, for the
fourth time in less than a month, plaintiffs granted Defendant
Miller an extension of time to file her answer.

(R. at 29.)

Two and one-half hours later, at 4:34 p.m., in spite of being
informed three times in writing that Defendants Anderson did not
have to file an answer, Defendants Anderson filed an answer and
affirmatively sought recovery of their attorney's fees.
21.)

Additionally,

after

plaintiffs

had

granted

(R. at

her

four

extensions of time, and after being told she did not yet have to
file, Defendant Miller filed an answer and affirmatively sought
recovery of her attorney's fees.

(R. at 16.)

Citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, the trial court denied
plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees.

(R. at 129).

determined

attorney's

that

plaintiffs' motion

for

Having

fees

was

meritless, the trial court then awarded defendants attorney's fees
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.

(R. at 129.)

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
It was error for the trial court to award attorney's fees to
the defendants pursuant to the bad faith statute, Utah Code Ann. §
78-27-56.

The defendants were not prevailing parties in the
9

underlying dispute and therefore were not entitled to attorney's
fees under the bad faith statute. The trial court further erred in
interpreting the quiet title statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, as
precluding an award of attorney's fees and thereby ruling that
plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees was without merit.

The

language of the quiet title statute, which in certain circumstances
prohibits an award of "costs," should not have been interpreted by
the trial court as prohibiting an award of "attorney's fees" as
well as prohibiting "costs."

In addition, there was no evidence

presented to the trial court to suggest, much less prove, that
plaintiffs' claim was brought or asserted in bad faith.
It was also error for the trial court to deny plaintiffs'
claim for attorneys' fees pursuant to the bad faith statute.
Because plaintiffs obtained the object of their lawsuit, they were
the prevailing parties in the underlying dispute.

Furthermore,

plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees under the bad faith
statute because Defendant Miller's claim to plaintiffs' property
was without merit. Plaintiffs had a clear and undisputed right to
the use and enjoyment of their property up to the fence line.
Additionally, Defendant Miller's claim to plaintiffs' land across
the fence line was made in bad faith.

She made her claim to

plaintiffs' property with the intent to force plaintiffs to pay
money for land she had repeatedly acknowledged was rightfully
theirs and with knowledge that the assertion of her claim would
hinder and delay the approval of plaintiffs' applied-for permits.

10

The court should include in its award the attorney's fees
incurred by plaintiffs prior to filing suit, which were incurred as
a result of defendants' bad faith assertion and maintenance of a
meritless claim.

11

ARGUMENT
I.

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S PEES TO
THE DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO THE BAD FAITH STATUTE.
In pertinent part, the bad faith statute states:

"In civil

actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense
to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.

Because the defendants were

not prevailing parties in the underlying dispute, they are not
entitled to attorney's fees under the bad faith statute.
Black's Law Dictionary gives an excellent statement of the
general rule and the definition of the term "prevailing party":
The party to a suit who successfully prosecutes the
action or successfully defends against it, prevailing
on the main issue, even though not necessarily to the
extent of his original contention. . . . To be such
does not depend upon the degree of success at
different stages of the suit, but whether, at the end
of the suit, or other proceeding, the party who made
a claim against the other, has successfully
maintained it.
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 1168 (West 1990).
In Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P. 2d 1034 (Utah
1981), the plaintiff, Highland Construction, claimed attorney's
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-8 (1953) (repealed by Laws 1980,
ch. 75 § 5) , which provided attorney's fees to the prevailing
party.

Highland claimed to be the prevailing party because five

and one-half months after filing suit the defendant, Stevenson,
admitted that he owed Highland and voluntarily paid Highland a
portion of the amount claimed in Highland's complaint.

The Utah

Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney's fees to Highland,
12

stating that "[i]n view of that payment after the action was
started, Highland was 'the prevailing party7 with regard to that
cause of action."

Id. at 1037.

The Highland court also stated

that Highland was the prevailing party because:
It should make no difference whether the plaintiff
recovers money from the defendant during the course
of the action by voluntary payment or whether the
plaintiff recovers that amount by a judgment.
In
both instances the plaintiff has recovered money by
virtue of its action.
Id. at 1037 (citations omitted).
Similarly, in Scatcherd v. Love, 166 F. 53 (6th Cir. 1908),
a federal court found that a defendant could not be considered the
successful party after he had acknowledged his liability to the
plaintiff by paying the claim upon which he was sued, prior to
judgment.

Instead, the court concluded that the plaintiff was the

successful party because his suit had brought about a satisfaction
of his claim against the defendant.
In the case now before this Court, plaintiffs filed a
complaint in order to obtain clear title to their property.
6.)

In their answers, defendants admitted

allegation contained in the complaint.

(R. at

every substantive

(R. at 16, 21.)

After

answering, Defendant Miller also signed a quitclaim deed and
Defendants Anderson provided a document admitting they had no
interest in the property.

(R. at 91.)

None of the defendants

prevailed on any claim or issue. In fact, they did not even obtain
a dismissal of the action.

They settled plaintiffs7 claim by

Defendant Miller delivering a deed to the disputed property and
Defendants Anderson delivering a document verifying they claimed no
13

interest in the property.

Thus, after plaintiffs filed the

complaint the plaintiffs obtained clear title to their property,
the object of their suit.

By awarding attorney's fees to the

defendants, the trial court awarded attorney's fees to the losing
party.
Nonetheless, the

trial

court

apparently

reasoned

that

defendants were the prevailing party because they were successful
on their motion for attorney's fees.

(R. at 165, 166.)

the court's reasoning was circular and unsound.

However,

In both essence

and fact, the trial court found that defendants were the prevailing
party because the court was awarding them attorney's fees, and the
court awarded defendants attorney's fees because the court found
they were the prevailing party.
It is a misapplication of the bad faith statute to apply its
penalty against a party for filing an unsuccessful motion for
attorney's fees.

If the trial court's intention was to discourage

the filing of frivolous motions (which plaintiffs' motion was not) ,
it applied the wrong law.

The court rules have clearly provided

for relief from the filing of frivolous motions of virtue of Utah
R. Civ. P. 11.
A plain reading of the bad faith statute makes evident the
conclusion that the statute requires the party seeking attorney's
fees to prevail on some claim or issue other than its bad faith
motion.

At a minimum, before awarding attorney's fees under the

bad faith statute, courts should require a finding that the moving
party

has

obtained

some

substantive
14

relief

in

its

favor.

Accordingly,

this

Court

should

reverse

the

trial

court's

determination that defendants were the prevailing party in the
underlying dispute and its award of attorney's fees to defendants.
A.

The language of the quiet title statute, which in
certain circumstances prohibits an award of "costs,"
should not have been interpreted by the trial court as
prohibiting an award of "attorney's fees" as well as
prohibiting "costs."

The quiet title statute states:

"If the defendant in . . .

[a quiet title] action disclaims in his answer any interest or
estate in the property, or suffers judgment to be taken against him
without answer, the plaintiff cannot recover costs."
Ann.

§ 78-40-3

(emphasis added).

Utah Code

The trial court apparently

misinterpreted "costs" to include attorney's fees. The quiet title
statute does not prohibit attorney's fees.
The long-settled distinction between costs and attorney's
fees is aptly made in the definition of "costs" found in Black's
Law Dictionary:

"Generally, 'costs' do not include attorney fees

unless such fees are by a statute denominated costs or are by
statute allowed to be recovered as costs in the case, Black's Law
Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 346 (West 1990).
It is well-settled in Utah that courts do not read "costs"
to include attorney's fees.

See, e.g., Tholen v. Sandy City. 849

P.2d 592 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); World Peace Movement of America v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253 (Utah 1994); Cluff v. Culmer.
556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976).

Thus, the trial court's interpretation

of the quiet title statute as prohibiting awards of attorney's fees
was clearly incorrect.
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B.

No evidence was presented to the trial court to
suggest, much less prove, that plaintiffs' claim was
brought or asserted in bad faith

In the present case, the trial court found that plaintiffs'
claim for attorney's fees under the bad faith statute was not
asserted in good faith.

(R. at 170.) Apparently, the trial court

was of the opinion that the quiet title statute's prohibition of
awarding costs also prohibited an award of attorney's fees, and
therefore any claim brought for attorney's fees under the quiet
title statute was, by definition, made in bad faith.
As evidenced by the arguments presented herein, plaintiffs
not only had sufficient legal and factual bases for their claim for
attorney's fees but also had ample case and treatise authority in
support of that claim.

The arguments presented in Section I.A,

support plaintiffs' position that a plain reading of the quiet
title statute would not prohibit their claim for attorney's fees.
Accordingly, plaintiffs had no reason whatsoever to suspect that
their claim for attorney's fees pursuant to the bad faith statute
was in any way precluded by the quiet title statute.

Plaintiffs

brought their claim with an honest belief it was appropriate and
well-founded in law and fact, and without any intent to hinder,
delay, defraud or take advantage of defendants, and defendants
presented absolutely no evidence to the contrary.

Other than the

actual cross-motion for attorney's fees filed by the Plaintiffs,
there is no evidence to marshall that shows the Plaintiffs were
acting in bad faith.

Therefore, the decision of the trial court

should be reversed.
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II.

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM
FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT TO THE BAD FAITH STATUTE.
In pertinent part, the bad faith statute states:

"In civil

actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense
to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.

A.

Because plaintiffs obtained the object of their
lawsuit, they were the prevailing party in the
underlying dispute.

The general rule and definition of the term "prevailing
party" have been discussed previously in Section I.

In the case

now before this Court, plaintiffs filed a complaint in order to
obtain clear title to their property from claims asserted by the
defendants.
the

After they filed the complaint, plaintiffs obtained

necessary

quit-claim

deed

from

Defendant

Miller

and

acknowledgment from Defendants Anderson of their lack of interest
in the property.

Accordingly, plaintiffs obtained the object of

their lawsuit. Plaintiffs were the prevailing party because their
suit brought about a satisfaction of their claim against the
defendants.

See Scatcherd v. Love, 166 F. 53, 56 (6th Cir. 1908).

Thus, "at the end of the suit" plaintiffs were "the party who made
a claim against the other, [and who] . . . successfully maintained
it."

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 1168 (West 1990).

See

also Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981).
At the October 5, 1995, hearing the trial judge stated,
". . . I wouldn't award attorney fees to you [plaintiffs] as a
prevailing party because you didn't have to fight for it [the
17

object of plaintiffs' lawsuit] very hard, and that is what the
statute says."

(R. at 168.)

The trial court apparently ruled

that, based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, the plaintiffs didn't
prevail in the underlying dispute because plaintiffs obtained from
defendants the object of their suit shortly after filing their
complaint and prior to any rulings from the court.
had no basis for this ruling.

The trial court

The prevailing party is the party

which wins the object of its suit, not the party who fought the
hardest. It the trial court's concern was with awarding attorney's
fees to a party who didn't have to fight much in order to prevail
(although that concern was completely unfounded in this case), that
concern is adequately addressed by the discretion granted to the
trial court to set the amount of attorney's fees it awards under
the bad faith statute.
Plaintiffs recognize that before a court awards attorney's
fees under the bad faith statute it should require a finding that
the moving party has obtained some substantial relief in its favor,
whether that be a favorable verdict, a default
dismissal, or a beneficial settlement.

judgment, a

In the present case,

plaintiffs obtained a beneficial settlement and were therefore the
prevailing party.

Accordingly, the trial court's ruling denying

plaintiffs an award of attorney's fees should be reversed.
B.

Defendant Miller's claim to plaintiffs' land across the
fence line was made in bad faith. She made that claim
with the intent to force plaintiffs to pay money for
land she had repeatedly acknowledged was rightfully
theirs and with knowledge that the assertion of her
claim would hinder and delay the approval of
plaintiffs/ applied-for permits.
18

In Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court defined good faith as having (1) an honest belief in
the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take,
unconscionable advantage of others; and

(3) no intent to, or

knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will, hinder,
delay or defraud others.

Jd. at 151.

To establish lack of good

faith, a party must prove that one or more of these factors is
lacking.

Sparkman and McLean Co. v. Derber. 481 P.2d 585 (Wash.

Ct. App. 1971).
In the present case, at least two of these factors —
most likely all three —

and

were lacking in the actions of Defendant

Miller. Defendant Miller acted with intent to take unconscionable
advantage of plaintiffs by forcing them to pay money for land that
she acknowledged was rightfully theirs.

(R. at 62, 64, 119.) When

Defendant Miller intentionally prevented plaintiffs from obtaining
a building permit, thereby interfering with plaintiffs' right to
build upon their land, she also acted with knowledge of the fact
that the activities she was undertaking would "hinder, delay or
defraud" plaintiffs.

(R. at 64.)

Defendant Miller even verbally

threatened plaintiffs that she would prevent them from selling
their property.

She told Plaintiff Fay Chipman that if plaintiffs

didn't pay her $12,000.00 for the land, she would "see that [they
would] never sell a bit of that ground."
Chipman, R. at 83, 85.)

(Affidavit of Fay

Defendant Miller used the fence as the

boundary when it was to her advantage, such as when she was
subdividing and deeding property. When it was to her advantage to
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not use the fence as the boundary line, as when she attempted to
coerce money from plaintiffs, Defendant Miller claimed ownership of
property beyond the fence.
Even after plaintiffs, their developer consultant, and two
different attorneys explained the facts and the law to Defendant
Miller, she refused to act reasonably.

Defendant Miller's actions

have been characterized as "self-induced myopia" (see R. Gerard
Lutz, Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Actions. 1984 Utah L.
Rev. 593, 607) and confirm that Defendant Miller lacked an honest
belief

in the appropriateness of her actions.

By requiring

plaintiffs to file a lawsuit before she would agree to convey the
quit-claim deed, Defendant Miller was "stubbornly litigious." See
American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 486 P. 2d 1042 (Utah 1971). The
actions taken by Defendant Miller were intended "to harass the
plaintiffs and force the plaintiffs to expend money on counsel."
Lutz, supra. at 601 n.85.
The only possible reason for Defendant Miller's myopia,
obduracy, and stubbornly litigious actions were to unconscionably
harass the plaintiffs into paying her money. Her claim of interest
in plaintiffs7 property was therefore asserted and maintained in
bad

faith, and the trial court's award of attorney

fees to

defendants should be reversed.
C.

Plaintiffs had a clear and undisputed right to the use
and enjoyment of their property up to the fence line,
and defendants' claim to plaintiffs' property was
therefore without merit.

A claim is without merit if it is "frivolous" or "of little
weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Jeschke, 811
20

P.2d at 203; Cadv v, Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983).

A

claim having no basis in law or fact is without merit, but is
nevertheless in good faith so long as there is an honest belief
that it is appropriate and so long as there is no intent to hinder,
delay, defraud or take advantage of another.

Cadv, 671 P.2d at

151.
Plaintiffs had a clear right, under the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence, to the use and enjoyment of their property up to
the fence line.

From the very outset of this dispute, no one has

claimed that the fence and hedge line had not continuously existed,
unmoved,

for over twenty years.

plaintiffs,

defendants,

and

No one has disputed

their

predecessors

in

that

interest

recognized the same fence and hedge line as the boundary between
the properties.

In fact, in her answer Defendant Miller admitted

every substantive allegation contained in the complaint.

She

stated that "she had acquiesced in and agreed with every request
made by plaintiffs in their First Cause of Action and only disputes
the claim of the attorney fees."

(R. at 19.)

Thus, even the

defendants eventually admitted that their assertion of interest in
plaintiffs' property was without any basis in law or fact —
it was without merit.
D.
There are important policy reasons
plaintiffs' argument
that
the
attorney's fees arising from the
statute should not be superseded by
title statute's prohibition of an
costs.

that

supporting
right
to
bad faith
the quiet
award of

There are two ways a trial court's docket can be clogged with
frivolous litigation.

In the first scenario, Party A takes a
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completely

unreasonable

position, obstinately

sticks by that

position regardless of the facts or the law, and then files a
frivolous lawsuit. The bad faith statute clearly provides a remedy,
to the defendant who has been unnecessarily dragged into court by
Party A.

In the second scenario, Party B takes and maintains a

completely unreasonable position not supported by any laws or
facts, thereby causing damage to Party A.

In order to obtain

relief from Party B's frivolous claims or assertions, Party A may
eventually be left with no option but to resort to the courts.
If the trial court's interpretation of the bad faith statute
in the present case is affirmed, the statute would not provide a
remedy

for Party A, the aggrieved

scenario.
"stubbornly

Plaintiff, in the second

The statute would become a one-edged sword, punishing
litigious"

plaintiffs

and

allowing

"stubbornly

litigious" defendants to act with impunity. Such an interpretation
of the bad faith statute would result in reimbursement to a
defendant for the costs of preparing an unnecessary answer but
would withhold reimbursement from a plaintiff for the costs of
preparing an unnecessary complaint.

Under the trial court's

interpretation, no matter how obstinate or malicious a defendant's
pre-litigation conduct, the bad faith statute would provide no
relief for the injured plaintiff who is forced to hire an attorney,
prepare a complaint, and go to court to reclaim property that is
indisputably his.
Equity should not and does not allow such disparate treatment
of parties. In fact, Utah courts have recognized that an award of
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attorney's fees can and should be used to curb the actions of
obstinate defendants who require plaintiffs to resort to the courts
unnecessarily.

In Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App.

1995), the court noted:
[T]here are exceptions to the general rule that
attorney's fees may only be awarded pursuant to
contract or statute. In Stewart v. Public Service
Comm'n. 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that "in the absence of a
statutory or contractual authorization, a court has
inherent equitable power to award reasonable
attorney's fees when it deems appropriate in the
interest of justice and equity." Courts have used
the inherent power in various categories of cases.
For example, courts have used their equitable power
to award attorney's fees where a party has acted "'in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons.'"
Id. at 782 (quoting James W. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice, Section 54.77 (2d Ed.
1972)) .
In Jensen, the plaintiff was "required to finance legal fees to
compel [the defendant] to fulfill his statutory obligations and
duties" and "had little choice in bringing this matter before the
Court . . . ."

Jensen, 892 P.2d at 1058.

Therefore, the court

determined, "we believe that under these circumstances, equity
demands the award of attorney's fees."

Id. at 1059.

Because the

plaintiff in that case had a clearly defined right to the relief
sought

and

the defendant

obstinately

refused

to permit her

enjoyment of that right, the court awarded plaintiff attorney's
fees.
Other

courts

similarly

award

attorney's

fees

against

defendants who force plaintiffs to file suit in order to enjoy
clearly defined rights.

In Harkeen v. Adams, 377 A.2d 617 (N.H.

1977), the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined that, "where an
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individual

is forced to seek judicial

clearly defined

and established

assistance

to secure a

right, which should have been

freely enjoyed without such intervention," the individual should be
awarded his attorney's fees.

Id. at 619; see also Andrews v.

District of Columbia, 443 A.2d 566, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert,
denied. 459 U.S. 909 (1982); Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of
Richmond, 345 F.2d

310, 321

(4th Cir. 1965), vacated on other

grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965).

These courts reason that a party

forced

and pay

to

establish

retain
an

an attorney

airtight

claim

unnecessary monetary damages.

ends

up

the

attorney's

suffering

fees to

substantial,

See Upson v. Board of Trustees, 474

A.2d 582 (N.H. 1984) (recognizing that in cases where there is a
clearly established right which should have been enjoyed without
judicial intervention, an award of attorney's fees is proper when
a person is forced by another in bad faith to litigate to establish
that right); see also Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and
the Great Society, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 792 (1966).
Courts have also held that an award of attorney's fees is
warranted

where a plaintiff was

forced to

litigate to regain

possession of property that had been converted by the defendant.
See Gladstone v. Hillel, 250 Cal. Rptr. 372, 380-81 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988); Motor Ins. Co. v. Singleton. 677 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1984); and Fulks v. Fulks. 121 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio 1953).
also 18 Am. Jur.2d Conversion § 120.

See

When a party intentionally

intrudes on the rights of another, and forces the other party to
sue, the party who caused the litigation should pay the other's
24

attorney's fees.

See Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond. 345 F.2d

310, 321 (4th Cir. 1965) (holding that attorney's fees should be
awarded "when it is found that the bringing of an action should
have been unnecessary and was compelled by the

[defendant's]

unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy").
For decades, plaintiffs in the instant case had a clearly
defined and established right to the use and enjoyment of the
property north of the fence line.

(R. at 4, 5.)

Plaintiffs should

not be precluded from recovering their attorney's fees simply
because

defendants'

conduct

required

plaintiffs

to

initiate

litigation to quiet title rather than waiting for defendants to sue
them.

It was inequitable for defendants to force plaintiffs to

litigate for a right to which they were already entitled and should
have enjoyed without interference.

Requiring plaintiffs to also

bear the costs of judicially securing that right from meritless and
bad faith claims would only compound that inequity.
III.

PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE REIMBURSED FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED
PRIOR TO FILING SUIT, INCURRED AS A RESULT OF DEFENDANTS'
BAD FAITH ASSERTION AND MAINTENANCE OF A MERITLESS CLAIM.
The issue of reimbursement for pre-litigation attorney's fees

based on the bad faith statute has not been previously determined
in Utah. However, there is significant precedent and authority in
other jurisdictions supporting such an award.

The U.S. Supreme

Court has stated that "it is clear" that bad

faith conduct

sufficient to serve as the basis for an award of attorney's fees
can as readily "be found . . .

in the actions which led to the

lawsuit" as in "the conduct of the litigation" itself.
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Hall v.

Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13 (1973).

See also Roadway Express Inc. v.

Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980); Schlank v. Williams, 572 A.2d 101,
111

(D.C. Ct. App. 1990) ("assum[ing] . . . that on a proper

showing

appellant

would

have

been

entitled

to

pre-litigation

attorney's fees); 31 A.L.R. Fed. 833, Award of Counsel Fees to
Prevailing Party Based on Adversary's Bad Faith, Obduracy, or Other
Misconduct: and 49 A.L.R. 4th 825, Attorney's Fees; Obduracy, As
Basis For State Court Award.
Furthermore, numerous other state courts have held that an
award of attorney's fees is warranted by "bad faith" or "obduracy"
during the pre-litigation time period.

The courts' analyses in

these cases focused on state statutes which are similar to Utah's
bad faith statute in their failure to explicitly provide for or
restrict a court's authority to grant an award of attorney's fees
for pre-litigation bad faith conduct. See, e.g., Harkeen v. Adams,
377 A.2d 617

(N.H. 1977);

Griffin v. New Hampshire

Dept. of

Employment Security, 370 A.2d 278 (N.H. 1977).
This

Court

should

follow

the well-established

reasoning used by other jurisdictions and award

line

of

pre-litigation

attorney's fees to parties when the bad faith conduct of another
forces them to unnecessarily fight for a clearly established right,
eventually necessitating the filing of an unnecessary lawsuit.
This Court should also award pre-litigation attorney's fees in
order to discourage pre-litigation bad faith conduct.

Because bad

faith

results

conduct

both

before

and

during

litigation

in

frivolous lawsuits clogging the legal system and innocent parties
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being forced to spend money protecting rights that should never
have been the subject of litigation, attorney's fees for prelitigation

bad

faith

actions

should

be

recoverable

by

the

prevailing party.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision constituted error in awarding
attorney's fees to the defendants because defendants were not the
prevailing party in the underlying dispute and are therefore not
entitled to attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, the
bad faith statute.
The trial court also erred in denying plaintiffs' claim for
attorney's fees by misinterpreting Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, the
quiet title statute, and thereby determining that plaintiffs'
request for attorney's fees was without merit.

The trial court

incorrectly ruled that this statute's prohibition against an award
of "costs" also prohibits an award of "attorney's fees." The quiet
title statute does not preclude an award of attorney's fees.
The trial court further committed error in denying an award
of attorney's fees to plaintiffs pursuant to the bad faith statute.
First, the trial court erred in failing to award attorney's fees to
plaintiffs given that plaintiffs were the prevailing party in the
underlying dispute.

Second, because Defendant Miller's claim to

plaintiffs' property was meritless due to plaintiffs' clear and
undisputed right to the property, plaintiffs have a right to an
award of attorney's fees under the bad faith statute.
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Third,

plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's

fees because Defendant

Miller's claim to the plaintiffs' property was made in bad faith.
She asserted that claim with the intent to hinder and delay
plaintiffs' enjoyment of an undisputed right and to attempt to
force them to pay money to enjoy that right.
Finally, this Court should adopt the practice of other
jurisdictions of allowing an award of pre-litigation attorney's
fees incurred by one party as a result of another party's bad faith
conduct.

Given defendants' bad faith actions which necessitated

the filing of plaintiffs' complaint, this Court should accordingly
award plaintiffs reimbursement for all attorney's fees incurred in
this matter.
For these reasons, plaintiffs respectfully request that this
Court reverse the order of the trial court, thereby denying
attorney's fees to the defendants and awarding attorney's fees to
the plaintiffs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

*r

day of

Yu^
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Attorney for Appellants
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JUDICIAL CODE

78-27a-2

public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover
from a ski operator for injuries resulting from those inherent
risks.
1979

receives attorney's fees and costs as all or part of a settlement
or award, shall forfeit to the General Fund, from its appropriated monies, an amount equal to the attorney's fees received.

78-27-52. Inherent risks of skiing — Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or
conditions which are an integral part of the sports of
skiing, snowboarding, and ski jumping, including, but not
limited to: changing weather conditions, variations or
steepness in terrain; snow or ice conditions; surface or
subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth,
rocks, stumps, impact with lift towers and other structures and their components; collisions with other skiers;
and a skier's failure to ski or jump within the skier's own
ability.
(2) "Injury" means any personal injury or property
damage or loss.
(3) "Skier" means any person present in a ski area for
the purpose of engaging in the sport of skiing, nordic,
freestyle, or other types of ski jumping, and
snowboarding.
(4) "Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area
operator to be used for skiing, nordic, freestyle, or other
type of ski jumping, and snowboarding.

1981

(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons, and their
agents, officers, employees or representatives, who operate a ski area.
1993

78-27-53. Inherent risks of skiing — Bar against claim
or recovery from operator for injury from
risks inherent in sport.
Notwithstanding anything in Sections 78-27-37 through
78-27-43 to the contrary, no skier may make any claim
against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury
Resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing.
1986

78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing inherent risks and limitations on liability.
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more
prominent locations within each ski area which shall include
a list of the inherent risks of skiing, and the limitations on
liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act.
1979
?8-27-55.

Repealed.

1980

78-27-56.

Attorney's f e e s — Award w h e r e action or

defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court sha!} award reasonable attorney's fees to a prpvqilin^ party if the court determines that the
action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited
fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; or
(bj the court enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1).
1988

78-27-56,5. Attorney's fees — Beciprocal rights to re'
cover attorney's fees.

78-27-58. Service of judicial process by persons other
than law enforcement officers.
Persons who are not peace officers, constables, sheriffs, or
lawfully appointed deputies of such officers or authorized state
investigators may not serve any forms of civil or criminal
process other than complaints, summonses, and subpoenas.
1993

78-27-59. Immunity for transient shelters.
(1) As used in this section, "transient shelter" means any
person which provides shelter, food, clothing, or other products or services without consideration to indigent persons.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), all transient
shelters, owners, operators, and employees of transient shelters, and persons who contribute products or services to
transient shelters, are immune from suit for damages or
injuries arising out of or related to the damaged or injured
person's use of the products or services provided by the
transient shelter.
(3) This section does not prohibit an action against a person
for damages or injury intentionally caused by t h a t person or
resulting from his gross negligence.
1986
78-27-60.

L i m i t e d i m m u n i t y for a r c h i t e c t s a n d engineers inspecting earthquake damage.

( D A professional engineer licensed under Title 58, Chapter
22, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors Licensing Act,
or an architect licensed under Title 58, Chapter 3, Architects
Licensing Act, who provides structural inspection services at
the scene of a declared national, state, or local emergency
caused by a major earthquake is not liable for any personal
injury, wrongful death, or property damage caused by the good
faith inspection for structural integrity or nonstructural elements affecting health and safety of a structure used for
human habitation or owned by a public entity if the inspection
is performed:
(a) voluntarily, without compensation or the expectation of compensation;
(b) at the request of a public official or city or county
building inspector acting in an official capacity; and
(c) within 30 days of the earthquake.
(2) The immunity provided for in Subsection (1) does not
apply to gross negligence or willful misconduct.
1992
CHAPTER 27a
SMALL B U S I N E S S EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
Section
78-27a-l.
78-27a-2.
78-27a-3.
78-27a-4.
78-27a-5.

Short title.
Legislative findings — Purpose.
Definitions.
Litigation expense award authorized in actions
by state.
Litigation expense award authorized in appeals
from administrative decisions.
Payment of expenses awarded — Statement required in agency's budget.

A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party
that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note,
Written contract, or other writing executed after April 28,
1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees.
1986

78-27a-l. Short title.

78-27-57.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Small
Business Equal Access to Justice Act."
1983

Attorney's f e e s a w a r d e d to state f u n d e d
a g e n c y in a c t i o n a g a i n s t s t a t e or s u b d i v i s i o n
— Forfeit of a p p r o p r i a t e d m o n i e s .
Any agency or organization receiving state funds which, as
a result of its suing the state, or political subdivision thereof,

78-27a-6.

78-27a-2. L e g i s l a t i v e findings — P u r p o s e .
The Legislature finds that small businesses may be deterred
from seeking review of or defending against substantially

JUDICIAL CODE

78-39-48

in common for the protection, confirmation or perfecting of the
title, or setting the boundaries, or making a survey or surveys
of the estate partitioned, the court shall allow to the parties to
the action who have paid the expenses of such litigation or
other proceedings all the expenses necessarily incurred
therein, including attorneys' fees, which shall have accrued to
the common benefit of the other tenants in common, with
interest thereon from the date of making such expenditures,
and the same m u s t be pleaded and allowed by the court and
included in the final judgment, and shall be a lien upon the
share of each tenant, in proportion to his interest, and shall be
enforced in the same m a n n e r as taxable costs of partition are
taxed and collected.
1953
78-39-48. A b s t r a c t of title, c o s t of, i n s p e c t i o n .
If it appears to the court t h a t it was necessary to have made
an abstract of the title to the property to be partitioned and
such abstract h a s been procured by the plaintiff, or if the
plaintiff h a s failed to have the same made before the commencement of the action and any one of the defendants shall
have such abstract afterwards made, the cost of the abstract,
with interest thereon from the time the same is subject to the
inspection of the respective parties to the action, must be
allowed and taxed. Whenever such abstract is procured by the
plaintiff before the commencement of the action he must file
with his complaint a notice t h a t an abstract of the title has
been made and is subject to the inspection and use of all the
parties to the action, designating therein where the abstract
will be kept for inspection. But if the plaintiff has failed to
procure such abstract before commencing the action, and any
defendant shall procure the same to be made, he shall, as soon
as he has directed it to be made, file a notice thereof in the
action with the clerk of the court, stating who is making the
same and where it will be kept when finished. The court, or the
judge thereof, may direct, from time to time during the
progress of the action, who shall have custody of the abstract.
1953

78-39-49. Interest on advances to be allowed.
Whenever during the progress of the action for partition any
disbursement shall have been made, under the direction of the
court or the judge thereof, by a party thereto, interest must be
allowed thereon from the time of making the same.
1953
CHAPTER 40
QUIET TITLE
Section
78-40-1.
78-40-2.
78-40-3.
78-40-4.
78-40-5.
78-40-6.
78-40-7.
78-40-8.
78-40-9.
78-40-10.
78-40-11.
78-40-12.

Action to determine adverse claim to property —
Authorized.
Lis pendens.
Disclaimer or default by defendant — Costs.
Termination of title pending action — J u d g m e n t
— Damages.
Setoff or counterclaim for improvements made.
Right of entry pending action for purposes of
action.
Order therefor — Liability for injuries.
Mortgage not deemed a conveyance — Foreclosure necessary.
Alienation pending action not to prejudice recovery.
Actions respecting mining claims — Proof of
customs and usage admissible.
Temporary injunction in actions involving title to
mining claims.
Service of summons and conclusiveness of judgment.

Section
78-40-13.

514
J u d g m e n t on default — Court must require evidence — Conclusiveness of judgment.

78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim to property
— Authorized.
An action may be brought by any person against another
who claims an estate or interest in real property or an interest
or claim to personal property adverse to him, for the purpose
of determining such adverse claim.
1953
78-40-2. Lis p e n d e n s .
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession
of, real property the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time of filing his
answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at
any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the
county in which the property or some part thereof is situated
a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names of
the parties, the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in t h a t county affected thereby. From the
time of filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser or
encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and
only of its pendency against parties designated by their real
names.
1953
78-40-3. D i s c l a i m e r or default by d e f e n d a n t - ^ C o s t s . j
If the defendant in such action disclaims in his answer any
interest or estate in the property, or suffers judgment to be
taken against him without answer, the plaintiff cannot recover
jEbsts^
1953
78-40-4.

T e r m i n a t i o n of title p e n d i n g a c t i o n — J u d g ment — Damages.
If the plaintiff shows a right to recover at the time the action
was commenced, but it appears t h a t his right has terminated
during the pendency cf the action, the verdict and judgment
m u s t be according to the fact, and the plaintiff may recover
damages for withholding the property.
1953
78-40-5.

Setoff or c o u n t e r c l a i m for i m p r o v e m e n t s
made.
When damages are claimed for withholding the property
recovered, upon which permanent improvements have been
made by a defendant, or those under whom he claims, holding
under color of title adversely to the claims of the plaintiff, in
good faith, the value of such improvements, except improvements made upon mining property, m u s t be allowed as a setoff
or counterclaim against such damages.
1953
78-4G-6.

R i g h t of e n t r y p e n d i n g a c t i o n for p u r p o s e s of

action.
The court in which an action is pending for the recovery of
real property, or for damages for an injury thereto, or to quiet
title or to determine adverse claims thereto, or a judge of such
court, may, on motion, upon notice by either party, for good
cause shown, grant an order allowing to such party the right
to enter upon the property and m a k e survey and measurement thereof, and of any tunnels, shafts or drifts thereon for
the purpose of the action, even though entry for such purpose
has to be made through other lands belonging to parties to the
action.
1953
78-40-7. Order t h e r e f o r — Liability for injuries.
The order m u s t describe the property, and a copy thereof
m u s t be served on the owner or occupant, and thereupon such
party may enter upon the property with necessary surveyors
and assistants, and may make such survey and measurement;
but if any unnecessary injury is done to the property, he is
liable therefor.
1953

2
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REGULAR SESSION

H"r*n*
The American Fork City Planning,Commi|^cMiyfe^i|Lg*ra| raxa OflkjJune
15, 1994, at 7:00 p.m. in the American Fork cigy^Hal.1 Jm^T^gye in
attendance include Olani Durrant, John McKinney, Kent Walker,
Michael Georgeson, Juel Belmont, Howard Denney, Rod Despain, James
Hansen, *Richard Colborn, Jan Miller, Mr. and Mrs. Curtis Chipman,
Reed Elm, Stephen Sowby, Wayne Patterson, Bill Arbus, Daniel
Copper, Todd McCabe, Michael Menlove, and 13 citizens. Not in
attendance were Patrick Fleming and J.H. Hadfield, who were
excused. Terilyn Nelson took the first portion of the minutes.
ACTION ON THE HANSEN-SYKES ADDITION ANNEXATION AT 755 WEST 700
NORTH CONSISTING OF 3.107 ACRES TO BE ZONED Rl-15.000
James Hansen, representing his father noted the point of the
differences in the numbers of acres on the agenda • and the
annexation application.
The reason for this was on the
recommendation given a couple of months ago to get additional
property for annexation. Howard Denney pointed out a problem of
.17" difference between the Carson property and the Hansen-Sykes
addition that would need to be worked out. John McKinney moved to
approve and recommend the Hansen/Sykes Annexation and zoning of Rl15,000 to the City Council. Michael Georgeson seconded the motion.
It was noted that it was the first annexation to the City of Rl15,000. All were in favor.
ACTION ON THE FINAL PLAT OF CURTIS CHIPMAN PLAT A SUBDIVISION AT
205 WEST 1120 NORTH
The problem brought to the Planning Commission was the dispute
between the property lines of Jan Miller to the south and the
Chipmans. There was a 5 foot discrepancy in which the Chipmans
were claiming 5 feet that Ms. Miller said was hers. The Commission
pointed out that the
and that they could not talce any" adtion untTT"~the problem was
settled between the property owners.
Mrs. Chipman said that a
city official told her that the fence line was the property line,
but she didn't know the name of the city official. It was pointed
out that ten years ago, it was the fence line that was law, then it
changed to yard by yard. It was suggested that both Ms. Miller and
the Chipmans were paying taxes on the piece of property. Olani
The two parties were told that they would have to
It was decided that Ms. Miller would
not get occupancy and the Chipmans would not get a building permit
until the problem was solved.
ACTION ON THE BALLANTYNE ANNEXATION CONSISTING OF .40 ACRES AT 420
NORTH 900 EAST TO BE ZONED Rl-9000
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1 HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Gordon Duval, Bar No. 6532
2 Attorney for Plaintiffs
110 South Main Street
3 Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
Telephone (801) 785-5350
4 Facsimile (801) 785-0853
5

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH

6
CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN,
7

AFFIDAVIT OF NOALL T.
WOOTTON

Plaintiff,
8
9

vs.

JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON,
10 and KIM ANBERSON.
11

Civil No. 950400145
Judge Guy R. Burningham

Defendants.

12
STATE OF UTAH
13
14

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH )
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice in Utah.

I

15
represented Curtis and Fay Chipman in a property boundary dispute
16
with Jan Miller.

I dictated and prepared the attached memo that

17
described my conversation with Jan Miller on July 29, 1994. That
18
memo correctly reflects my conversation with Jan at that time.
19
FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
20
21

DATED this

/fj%

da

Y

of Ma

Y ' 1995.

22
23

NOALL T. WOOTTON

24
Brisc-pldg-AchipnenVaffidavit

4•WcorcA

Od- ? i

1

2

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
1995.

A

ay of May,

3
4
5 MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
6

iTARY SIGNATURE/
'O
RESIDING AT UTAH COUNTY

-f

/

8

\$*&rM

OREM, UTAH 84057
y

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
fnisc-pldg- Achip«an\af f idavi t

COMl EXP. 7-15-96

To:

The File

From:

Noall T. Wootton

Date:

July 29, 1994

Subject:

Curtis Chipman

I met with Jan Miller this morning for a little over two
hours. We went over the plats- At first, her attitude was that
she wanted $8,000 from Curtis Chipman if he wants a Quit-Claim
Deed to that property. She says, however, that she does not
intend to disturb the present fenceline, but if he wants a record
title to his property he is going to have to pay something for
it. She said $8,000 is not a magical figure, but one she
calculated because she had to pay $2,000 for about 200 feet of
property along 150 West that Taylor demanded and figured this
Chipman property was about 4 times that long. She did say that
she would settle for $4,000, and she definitely does not want to
go to court unless it is necessary.
On the Evans and Elms properties, she was at first adamant
that she would not sell any property to them under any
circumstances. Her reasoning was that the property in issue was
accepted into the Miller Hilltop Subdivision plat by the City,
and she does not want to have to go to the costs and
inconvenience of amending that plat. I asked her if she would be
willing to give them title to that property if they were willing
to take care of getting her plat amended to take it out of there
and if they would, in addition, put up a decorative fence of some
kind. She said that if her son-in-law, Dana Anderson, and her
daughter, Kim, were willing to do that, she will do it also.
Jan is going to talk to Dana and get back with me. I told
her that as soon as she had done that, I would bring my clients
in and would review everything and get back to her. Her position
is that the lot 204 and lot 214 that Evans and Elms respectively
own were never included in the plat of their property, so they
never owned anything south of that down to the fence. I need to
get a copy of that subdivision plat to see whether they bought
the property by metes and bounds or whether they bought it by lot
number. I also need to find out by them whether they knew that
their platted lot number did not extend down to the fence. She
tells me that she was privy to a conversation that they had with
somebody (I think she mentioned the Mayor) wherein they
acknowledged that they knew they didn't own that property.
I should wait to hear from her before proceeding further.

Qtt&rd

cut U 2*

-

HAH:DING & A S S O C I A T E S ,

P.C.

A T T O W N C Y 3 AT LAW
HO S O U T H

MAIN

3T*<CT

PLSA3AXT OROVB, UTAH 8 4 0 6 2
r c i c P N O N C taon 7 e s - « 3 a o
•AY M

MAMOINO. j »

/ T A C S I M I L C (son

Tas-oeaa

J A M I S *'UCHt>»" HAN9CN
OOMOON OUVAC
MANSHAUL S. WITT
MA«C H. ICAUCMCMIN

30e

WC3T MAIN

AMWICAN

rO«K,

TCUCPMONC
TAC3IMII.C

teOll
lAOil

STWCCT

UTAH

««003

73<0-7QBe
79«-7699

December 8, 1994
Janice Miller
P.O. BOX 784
American Fork, UT
Re:

84003

Ownership of Land Along the Chipman Fenceline

Dear Ms. Miller:
Curtis and Faye Chipman have asked that I represent them in their
efforts to obtain clear title to the property within their fenceline and
along their boundary. I understand there have been some communications
with you regarding this and that you insist on being paid for the land
within their fenceline. I have attached a case decided by the Utah Court
of Appeals just a few weeks ago that clearly establishes that the Chipmans
are entitled to the property within their fenceline and they do not need
to buy it from you. This is because the fenceline has created a situatioa
known as "boundary by acquiescence.If That fence has been there as long as
anybody can remember and has been treated as the boundary for decades*
The Carter case that I have attached explains more fully why the Chipmans
are entitled to the land within their fenceline without payment. There
are many other Utah cases that stand for the same proposition.
If necessary the Chipmans will pursue their legal rights in the
courts.. I feel confident they will prevail if they are required to pursue
that action. However, neither they nor I wish to take such drastic action
unless it is absolutely necessary. They would much prefer to resolve this
matter through conversation. To that end, please give me a call at 7855350 so we can set up an appointment to get this matter resolved. If you
have an attorney, I would encourage you to make him aware of this
situation. If the Chipmans are forced to litigate this matter, it is very
likely the court would require you to pay the Chipmans' attorney's fees.
Please respond by December 18, 1994, so we can get this matter
resolved in as cordial a way as possible. I am looking forward to hearing
from you.
Sincerely,
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
GORDON DUVAL
Attorney at Law
GDtskh
cc: Curtis and Faye Chipman
Enclosure
misc-corp-5\mllr«cv.ltr
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J a n u a r y 1 1 , 1995
(HAND DELIVERED)
( 2:£Q p.m.)

Jan Miller
1095 North 150 West
American Fork, UT 84003
Re:

Demand L e t t e r

Dear J a n :
I am enclosing the original quit-claim deed resolving the
boundary dispute between you and the Chipmans. I strongly urge you
to sign the deed and deliver it to Mountain West Title Company, 871
South Orem Boulevard, Orem, Utah, rio later than January 13, 1995.
I have met with you and understand your position in this matter.
I have extensively reviewed legal documents, deeds, and plats
relating to the disputed land area and I have come to the
conclusion that it is unreasonable for you to delay signing any
longer- I believe any arguments you may raise in defense to this
case would be frivolous. I understand you may not agree with my
characterization of the case. However, I believe the following
documents set forth in chronological order will explain how I
arrived at that conclusion.
I have attached two maps that will assist you in locating the
areas discussed in the various deeds I will reference. The first
**p shows the general area and the general relationship of the
disputed property to other adjoining properties. The second map is
*ore detailed containing the actual survey boundaries. Both maps
are color coded to reflect the various deeds.
!•

Exhibit A is the warranty deed whereby the Chipmans
acquired the corner lot identified in yellow. This deed
did not convey title all the way to the fence line that
has existed for decades.

2«

Exhibit B is a copy of the deed from you to NuTeam Inc.
so they could proceed with rhe development of Kimberly
Estates, This deed relates to the property identified in
orange. This deed was executed in December 1991 and it
is important because it shows as early as 1991, you were
not paying for property taxes on the disputed area- The
legal description of that deed shows the bearina of

Jan Miller
January 11, 1995
Page 2

"South S^S'lS" East along a fence line-'1 That is a
very important bearing because it is the bearing related
to the fence line which is the subject of this dispute.
You did not purport to convey any property north of that
fence line and NuTeam purchased only up to the fence
line.
3.

Exhibit C is another document with your signature that
relies on the fence line as a boundary. This is the
document that apparently transfers your property from
your trust to yourself as an individual. It is dated
July 1993.
The first part of the legal description
refers to the area in pink, where your personal residence
is located. You will note that the deed very clearly
does not refer to property north of the fence line.
Therefore your assertion that you had been paying
property taxes on the disputed area is incorrect at least
for recent years.
The deed by which you hold the
property clearly only goes to the fence line and no
further. The second parcel of property identified in
that deed is highlighted in blue. It also refers only to
the fence line and does not purport to convey any
interest nortlv of the fence line.

4«

Exhibit D is the plat map of Kimberly Estates and it
shows that the old fence line was recognized by both
Hillcrest Acres and Kimberly Estates as the property
boundary between the two subdivisions. For 932.45 feet
the dividing boundary betweea the two subdivisions is the
fence running south 89°49/ east. The only place where
that is not the case is the last 61.28 feet in the
northeastern property boundary where Kimberly Estates
Subdivision specifically extends north of the fence line
by 5.3 6 feet. All landowners on both sides of the fence
for hundreds of feet accept the fence line and the
bearing boundary that it creates as the appropriate
property boundary line. The only exception is a little
jog of 3 34 square feet where NuTeam, Inc., (Kimberly
Estates) purchased additional property north of its lot
44.

5«

Exhibit E is the quit-claim deed describing the 61 foot
by 5 foot piece of land bought by Kimberly Estates north
of the fence line. This area is identified in purple.
Like NuTeam, Inc., if you claim property north of the
fence line, you would have to buy it from the owners just
like NuTeam, Inc., did.

Jan Miller
January 11, 1995
Page 3

6.

The last exhibit, Exhibit F, is a subdivision plat for
your own Miller Hilltop Subdivision. It too shows that
your subdivision generally accepted the fence line as the
boundary between Chipmans and your property. Once again
the boundary identified on the plat map is the bearing "S
39049/13,, E" which correlates to the bearing of the fence
line. Further, the easterly boundary of the subdivision
shows a distance of 171.1 feet, which is the distance to
the fence as is evidenced by the survey prepared by Cole
Surveying and Engineering.

I believe these various documents clearly show that the
Chipmans are entitled to the area identified in green. At least
three of the documents, Exhibits B, C, and F, were prepared bv you
or your agents. Each of those documents bears your signature and
reaffirms the fence line and its bearing (S 89a49'13" E) as the
boundary between you and the Chipmans. For you to now be asserting
an interest in property north of the fence line is unreasonable*
Your claim that you have been paying property taxes on the disputed
area is also invalid based upon these documents that show at least
in recent years you have only been paying property taxes on the
areas contained within the legal descriptions which reference the
fence line.
I understand that you are concerned about the short strip of
hedge that runs along the north side of your driveway. The hedge
has existed there for about five decades and constitutes a "visible
line" serving as a boundary just as real as the concrete fence of
which it is an extension. That hedge has divided your property
from the Chipmans7 property for almost 50 years and it should not
be disturbed unless there is some other replacement barrier to
divide the properties. Based upon "boundary by acquiesence," the
Chipmans have the same right to assert ownership over the area
enclosed by the hedge as they do to assert ownership over the area
enclosed by the fence line. The hedge is part of the fence line
boundary. However, the Chipmans are willing to relinquish control
over that small area so long as a substitute fence or other
suitable boundary is constructed on the fence line. The Chipmans
have assured me that they would be willing to split any costs
incurred in constructing a suitable boundary enclosure that
terminates on the existing corner post.
In other words, the
Chipmans are willing to relocate the hedge or other boundary marker
to correlate to the survey property line so long as the current
hedges are replaced by some other suitable boundary divider.
In conclusion, please deliver the executed deed to Mountain
West Title Company on or before January 13, 1995.
I will be
calling the title company at 5:00 p.m. on the 13th and if the
misc-corr-5\chpran-cv.Itr
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED
JANICE R, MILLER* TRDSTEB

County or

of A—rlceii Fork
QUIT-CLAIM to

grantor
, Sate of Utah, hereby

n»«h

JANICE R« MILLER* TRQSXBB

grantee
for the sum of
— DOLLARS,

TEH DOLLARS AM)OTHERGOOD AMD VALUABLE CONSIDERATION

tne following described tact
State of Uttk

County,

of land in usta

EXHIBIT "A* ASHCBED

/ o

MADE A PART

f-

Wmn» the hand of Mid grantor .this
«af
, A. D. 19 *j

day of

7tH

^JAMXCE R« MILLER/ SRDSXEB

STATE OF UTAH,
County of
Otah
w
On
~ the
—

ss.
77t tl ih

thousand nine hundred and ninety-thro*

day
of
—
w
7

A-D.ooc

j^-

personally appeared before me

JAXXCE R. K U A , TRBSIEE

thejagner

of*tbe withif* instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that

he

executed the same.

Nocaiy Public
Residing in.
My ootnmtoion expires.

|3
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QUFE-CLAIM DEED
(falTiH^V. Praadsea
QPII^CLAIM

County of

to

grantor
State of Utah, hereby

Utah

VOXeaa* lac.
°£

Salt Lake, Salt Lata, Utah
TBKfirMO/104 and other good and •alnable considerations

the following described tract
State of Utah;

of land in

grantee
for the nun of
DOLLARS,

Utah

County;

Be^ianin* at a bowdary corier oa the Sooth boaadary Una of Hill Crest
Acres Subdivision, Plat T , said boundary corier i s located Sooth
8*»49'S7~ Bast 49.2* feet fro* tfc* Soethvest Corner of lot 201 of said
sabdivisioa; thane* forth S.3* feat aloe? said boaadary
line; thane* East
#
61.2S feet aloe* taid
boaadary
line;
theaco
Soath
0
56'00*
Vast 5*54- feat;
Mortlratf49#S7* Vest 61.19 feet t o t*» podnt o t baalnftina*
itaiaia* 334 separ* feet*

the hand of
October

,4*

WTIHEM

A-D»

Signed in the presence o£

Twenty-sixth
etna oaaoced sad

dflJPOK

Hal?is V. Frandsea

22X.

oumwrniiams*.

h
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10.

The fence and hedge have existed for more than 20

2

years

3

plaintiffs,

4

defendants' predecessors in title, as the boundary line between

5

their respective properties during that time.

6

and

11.

have
and

continually
their

been

accepted

predecessors

in

and

title,

treated
and

by

by
the

At the time the defendants acquired title to the lands

7

lying south of the fence and hedge line, the fence and hedge was

8

already in existence upon the plaintiffs' land and separated the

9

plaintiffs' land from the land acquired by the defendants*

The

10

defendants acquired the land with full knowledge of the location^

11

of the fence and hedge and understood that plaintiffs and their

12

predecessors claimed title to all land to the north of the fence

13

and hedge.

14

12.

The defendants' predecessors

in title, with full

15

knowledge of the location of the fence and hedge, acquiesced,

16

agreed to, and recognized the location of the fence and hedge as

17

the agreed upon dividing line between the plaintiffs' and

18

defendants' property.

19

13.

In

the

past,

Defendant

Miller

acknowl edged

the

20

boundary created by the fence line.

In December of 1991

21

Defendant Miller executed a deed of real property to NuTeam,

22

Inc. The legal description in the defendant's deed employed the

23

fence line which is in dispute in this action as the northern

24

'QjiOoCd
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1 HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Gordon Duval, Bar No. 6532
2 Attorney for Plaintiffs
0.10 South Main Street
3 pleasant Grove, UT 84062
telephone (801) 785-5350
4 Facsimile (801) 785-0853
5

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, 3TATS OF UTAH

6
AFFIDAVIT OF CURTIS
CHIPMAN

(CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN,
7
Plaintiff,
8
vs.
(JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON,
10 land KIM ANDERSON.
9

Civil No. 950400145
Judge Guy R. Buraingham

Defendants.

11
12

(STATE OF UTAH )
13

) SS.

pOUNTY OF UTAH )
14
I, CURTIS CHIPMAN, being first duly sworn upon my oath,
15
declare and state as follows:
16
1.

I am a plaintiff in this matter.

2.

In discussions with Jan Miller in the spring of 1994

17
18
(she told me that she owned property five feet over the fenceline.
19
She told me that we had to buy that land from her. If we didn't
20
bay her she said "I'll see that you will never sell a bit of that
21
ground."

I believe that this is almost a direct quote.

22
3.

In the spring of 1994 I gave Jan's son-in-law a copy of

23
(the attached newspaper article trying to convince her that she
24
|»is€-ptdg-AchipMn\affidavit

1
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1 had no right to claim our property north of the fenceline.

I

2 [asked the son-in-law to give the article to Jan Miller.
3

4.

At the Planning Commission meeting of June IS, 1994,

4 [Tan Miller appeared and objected to our request for a building
5 permit so she could prevent our son from getting a building
6 permit.

Her actions caused us to lose hundreds of dollars and

7 jthree months of building time.
8

FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

9

DATED this

\

^

day of May, 1995,

10
11
CURTIS CHIPMAN
Plaintiff

12
13
14

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /
1995 •
»

-———

NOTARY PU8UC

^ day of May,

^

SUSAN K. HARRIS

15

110 S& "an SI

IHConntetaft6anclQ4'&

statfuai

16

A

i£

4*^>

£ii*A<Jo

NOTARY SIGNATURE
RESIDING AT UTAH COUNTY

17 MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
•tsc-pldg-AchipMfAaffidavit

1 HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Gordon Duval, Bar No. 6532
2 Attorney for Plaintiffs
0.10 South Main Street
3 Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
telephone (801) 785-5350
4 Facsimile (801) 785-0853
5

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY/ STATE OP UTAH

6
7

Plaintiff,

8
9

AFFIDAVIT OF FAY
CHIPMAN

[CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN,

Krs.

(JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON,
10 land KIM ANDERSON.
11

Civil No. 950400145
Judge Guy R. Burningham

Defendants.

12
13
14
15
16
17

(STATE OF UTAH )
) ss.
pOUNTY OF UTAH )
I, FAY CHIPMAN, being first duly sworn upon my oath, declare
land state as follows:
1.

I am a plaintiff in this matter.

2.

In discussions with Jan Miller in the spring of 1994

18
ishe told me that she owned property five feet over the fenceline.
19
She told me that we had to buy that land from her for $12,000.00.
20
If we didn't pay her she said "I'll see that you will never sell
21
k bit of that ground."

I believe that this is almost a direct

22
quote.
23
24
• i sc- pldg- Ach«pavt\af f t d«vi t

I*
-Kzcord

Odr $2>

1

3.

At the Planning Commission meeting of June 15, 1994,

2 |Jan Miller appeared and objected to our request for a building
3 permit
so she could prevent our son from getting a building
P
4 ermit.
5

FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

6

DATED this

\$

day of May, 1995.

7
8
9
10
11

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of May,

1995.

12
13
14 MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

NOTARY SIGNAQ
RESIDING AT UTAH COUNTY

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
misc-pldg- AchipmnVaf f idavi t
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HARDING & ASSOCIATES,

P.C.
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TCLCPHONC
RAY M. M A A O I N O , J R .
JAMC3 'TUCKCP" MANSCN
O O R O O N OUVAL
M A W H A C L 3. WITT
C. V A U M O A C C V

rACSiMILC

84062
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A M C R I C A N roAK
30«
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S*003
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FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL
Cover Sheet for FAX Transmissions
From HARDINGfrASSOCIATES, PC
FAX No* (801) 785-0853
TO:

Craia Snvder

RE:

Chioman v. Miller

FROMr

Gordon Duval /?<&
No. of pages sent

COMMENTS:

(Including cover sheet)

I have attached the document we discussed earlier.
If you will confirm in writing that Dana and Kim
Anderson do not claim an interest in property north
of the fence line between Andersons and Chipmans,
then I will aladlv prepare an order dismissing Dana
and Kim from the lawsuit.

As to Jan Miller, Please

answer on her behalf by close of business on
Wednesday, April 5, 1995.

Thank vou.

gd.fonosVfonn. Itr

ao

APR 03 '35 14:13

TRANSMISSION PEPORT
RECEIUER:

3T74991

PAGES SENT:

02

DURATION:

01:12

aI

IIO S O U T H * A I N
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44062

7i0-538O
AMCWICAN ' O f f *
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O O ^ O C N OVIVAC
MAWSMAVW 3 . W I T T
M A * C M. I C A U C M C M I N

0#1CC

3 0 * 1 W C S T MAIM S T t t C C T
AMMICAN * 0 * X . UTA*

S40C3

T C L t P H O N C (SOU 7 S « - 7 « a « .

TO:
FROM:

Gordon D u v a l ^

DATE:

Y/V<?5

RE:

/¥|;lkr

Enclosed p l e a s e find: anok^r
H

k<u*_ ao+ c^tlsrU

J*L

ya^r

0uiV-claim. C{AA.O J^*- y^w cb*%4.

Mtr

y e f , fcuf * * - * + . 11 " ^

^

For your information
In accordance vitit your- request, r
have signed and forwarded it to the?
court for signature*
Please sign before a notary publio
and return
Please telephone me
Please handle
Please sign and return
Please approve as to form and return
Please
review
and
immediately to discuss

call

me

Comments:

gd-f onm\f ormA tr

<25*
£jtHtt/+
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HARDING & ASSOCIATES,
ATTORNfYS
HO S O U T H

P.C.

AT LAW

MAIN

STREET

PT-BASAXT OHOVB, UTAJH S 4 0 6 8
TCUCPHONC
RAY M. H A A O l N Q , J R .
JAMCS "TUCKER"
HANSCN
O O f l O O N OUVAL
M A R S H A L L S. W I T T
C. V A L M O R U C V

FACSIMILE
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1800 7SS-O093

AMMICAN
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FAC8IMILB TRANSMITTAL
Cover Sheet for FAX Transmissions
From HARDING & ASSOCIATES, PC
FAX No. (801) 785-0853
TO:

Craia Snyder

RE:

Chipman v . M i l l e r

FROM:

Gordon Duval (*Q

No. of pages sent
COMMENTS:

(Including cover sheet)

I have not vet received the letter you mentioned or
the signed quit-claim deed.

I will need to file a

default judgment against Jan Miller on 4-18-95.

I

will not file the default judgment against the
Andersons based on vour representation that you will
confirm in writing that the Andersons do not assert
an interest in Chioman's property.

misc-corr-6\chipnm-cv. ttr

y\Wb±k ok
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APR 16 *95 07:22
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toil l^/JT*' fr <#^d«if-

3774991
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i v n t i b w /^^i/ v,wv»noeJUJK5 AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
FoftOfBoa BoxTTS
Prove. Utah 14603

Jackson Howard
Deo R. Pcttraai
Craig M. Snyder
John U Vakncnc
D. David Lambert
Fred D. Howard
Lcalk W. Skugh

Takpbooa:<W0 3*73-a345
FKsnmk: (901) 377-4991

Richard W. Dtyoct
I%iUip E. Lffwijr
jCdAAcsh Pafjcixuoit

OF COUNSEL
3. JUxLm*

April 14, 1995
VIA FAX # 78S41SS3
Gordon Duval, Esq.
Harding & Associates
110 South Main
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
Re:

Chipman v. Miller and Anderson

Dear Gordon:
Enclosed please find a copy of the Warranty Deed from Janice R. Miller to Dr. Dana
A. Anderson and his wife, Kim. Please be advised that Dr. and Mrs. Anderson do not claim
any interest in any property north of the existing fence line between the Anderson property and
the Chipman property. As I have indicated to you, Dr. Anderson believes that he and his wife
should not have been included as parties to the Chipmans' litigation.
I have also reviewed the allegations contained in your complaint with Mrs. Miller. I
have explained to her my understanding of the law with regard to boundary line by acquiescence
and I have also provided her with a copy of the information mat you furnished to me from
Pleasant Grove City concerning the hedge. Part of the problem is obviously that the ground
slopes significantly so that Mrs. Miller's driveway is actually significantly below 42 inches from
the top of the hedge. Nonetheless, Mrs. Miller is willing to sign a quit claim deed to the
Andersons if you will provide one that is consistent with a survey of the fence line.
I will endeavor to have her sign that quit claim deed to comply with your deadline^
however, she will not agree to pay attorney fees to your clients and quite frankly I believe you.
have no statutory basis for an award of attorney fees herein, particularly if she concedes the
allegations contained in your complaint. Furthermore, from our standpoint Dr. Anderson has
a claim for attorney fees in connection with these proceedings mat is probably superior from a
legal point of view to any claim that your clients may make against Mrs. Miller.
If this matter can be resolved on the basis suggested in this letter, please advise me
immediately. If it cannot, then it will be Mrs. Miller's intent to contest any request that yott
may make for attorney fees and it will be Dr. Anderson's intent to assert attorney fees against
your client and sanctions in accordance with Rule 11.
0\ \i?

HARDING & ASSOCIATES,

P.C.

A T T O R N E Y S A T LAW
HO S O U T H

MAIN

3TRCCT

PLEASANT GROVB. UTAH
TCLCPHONC
BAY M M A R O I N O . J « .
jAMCS " T U C K I R *
HANSCN
Q O R O O N OUVAL
MARSHALL S. WITT
C. VAL M O f l L C Y

rACSlMILC

84062
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30e

ro«K
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STRCCT

AMERICAN

r O R K , UTAH

TCLCPHONC

April 18, 1995
Fax and Mail Delivery
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Craig Snyder
120 East ^00 North
Provo, UT

Re:

84606

Chipman v. Miller

Dear Craig:
This letter serves as a follow-up to our telephone
conversation earlier today when I indicated an answer would be due.
I wanted to clarify that no answer is due from the Andersons. An
answer is only due from Ms. Miller, as previously stated in my
April 3, 1995, fax to you, I will prepare an order dismissing Dana
and Kim from the lawsuit based upon the letter I received from you
Friday indicating the Andersons are not claiming any interest in
property north of the existing fenceline between the Andersons and
the Chipmans.
You indicated you had a quit-claim deed signed by Ms. Miller
and could send me a copy of it. You also indicated you intended to
take additional actions escalating this lawsuit.
To avoid an
escalation of this situation, I am granting to you an extension of
time to file an answer until close of business on April 21, 1995.
That will allow me a chance to visit with my clients to see how
they want to proceed now that Ms. Miller has apparently signed a
quit-claim deed and you are in the process of delivering that deed
to me. To assist in the possible settlement of this situation,
please fax me a copy of the deed your client has signed, as well as
mailing the original to me as we previously discussed.
Thank you for your assistance and if you have any questions,
please feel free to give me a call.
Sincerely,
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
GORDON DUVAL
Attorney at Law
GD:skh
cc: Fay and Curtis Chipman

•Wc- corr-6\chipman-cv.ltr

vQeoo^c^
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CRAIG M. SNYDER (3033), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No.

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY
CHIPMAN,

ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS DANA
ANDERSON AND KIM ANDERSON,
COUNTERCLAIM AND REQUEST
FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON
and KIM ANDERSON,

Case No. 950400145
Judge Guy R. Burningham

Defendants.
ANSWER
COMES NOW the defendants Dana Anderson and Kim Anderson and answer the
Complaint of the plaintiffs on file herein and admit, deny and allege as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
There has been a complete accord and satisfaction in connection with this matter, since
the defendant Janice Miller has tendered a quit claim deed signed by her on the 14th day of
April, 1995, to the plaintiffs through their counsel. Said quit claim deed was prepared by
plaintiffs' counsel.

i&corcJ o=H^

ur\

SECOND DEFENSE
These defendants have never claimed any interest in any property lying north of the
fence line that exists between these defendants' property and the property owned by the
plaintiffs. These defendants have never had any conversation with the plaintiffs concerning any
property dispute. These defendants have informed the plaintiffs through counsel on April 7,
1995, and in writing on April 14, 1995, that they claimed no interest in the property lying north
of the fence line between these defendants and the plaintiffs, property.
THIRD DEFENSE
1.

These defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4

of the plaintiffs' Complaint.
2.

These defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the plaintiffs'

Complaint.
3.

Answering paragraph 6 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, these defendants reallege

and incorporate by reference their answers to the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through
5 of the plaintiffs' Complaint
4.

These defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the

plaintiffs' Complaint.
5.

Answering paragraph 8 of the plaintiffs* Complaint, these defendants deny that

there is a hedge between their property and the property of the plaintiffs, although these

2

defendants believe that there does exist a hedge between the plaintiffs' property and that of the
co-defendant Miller's property.
6.

Answering paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 of plaintiffs' Complaint, these

defendants admit the allegations contained therein with the exception of the reference to the
hedge between these defendants and the plaintiffs' property.
7.

These defendants are without sufficient knowledge and information to form a

belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of plaintiffs'
Complaint, Said allegations appear to apply to the co-defendant Miller, and these defendants
are without knowledge as to the truth of said allegations and, therefore, these defendants have
no basis to either admit or deny said allegations. These defendants, however, do not assert any
right, title or interest in the property lying north of the fence line that exists between these
defendants' property and the plaintiffs' property.
8.

These defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 17 and 18 of

plaintiffs' Complaint.
9.

These defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 19 of the

plaintiffs' Complaint.
10.

These defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 20 of the

plaintiffs' Complaint.

3

11.

Answering paragraph 21 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, these defendants reallege

and incorporate herein by reference each and every response made by these defendants to
paragraphs 1 through 20 of the plaintiffs' Complaint.
12.

Answering paragraph 22 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, these defendants assert

that they have never claimed any interest in property owned by the plaintiffs north of the existing
fence line between the plaintiffs' property and these defendants' property. Furthermore, these
defendants have informed the plaintiffs through their counsel orally on April 7, 1995, and by
letter dated April 14, 1995, that they assert no claim to any property lying north of the existing
fence line. These defendants deny that the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees based upon §
78-27-56, and they deny each and every other allegation contained in paragraph 22 of the
plaintiffs* Complaint.
13.

These defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 23 of the

plaintiffs' Complaint.
WHEREFORE, these defendants pray that plaintiffs take nothing by way of the Second
Cause of Action of their Complaint, that the plaintiffs be awarded the relief sought by their First
Cause of Action, since these defendants have never claimed any interest in any property located
north of the existing fence line, and that these defendants be awarded their costs and attorney
fees incurred in this action in accordance with the allegations contained in the attached
Counterclaim, together with such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and
proper in these premises.
4

3o

COUNTERCLAIM
COME NOW the defendants Dana Anderson and Kim Anderson and counterclaim
against the plaintiffs and for a cause of action allege:
1.

The action brought by plaintiffs against these defendants is without merit and

is neither brought nor asserted in good faith.
2.

These defendants have never claimed any right, title or interest in property

owned by the plaintiffs located north of the existing fence line between the plaintiffs' property
and these defendants' property.
3.

These defendants should never have been named as parties to this action.

4.

The existing deed to these defendants in their record chain of title does not

claim any property located north of the existing fence line.
5.

These defendants are entitled to their attorney fees pursuant to the provisions

of § 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
6.

Plaintiffs' complaint against these defendants is not well grounded in fact nor

is it warranted by existing law, and further, it is not interposed for any proper purpose.
Plaintiffs1 Complaint and their request for attorney fees is made only for purposes of harassment
and to needlessly increase the cost of this litigation. These defendants are entitled to sanctions,
including attorney fees and costs in accordance with the provisions of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

5

WHEREFORE, these defendants pray that the Court award their attorney fees and court
costs in accordance with the provisions of § 78-27-56 and/or Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,togetherwith such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper
in these premises.
DATED this **

day of April, 1995.

CRAIG M. SNYDER, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendants
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this (%

day of April, 1995.

Gordon Duval
Harding & Associates
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062

PHtA////*
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CRAIG M. SNYDER (3033), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
1*0 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone; (801) 373-^345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No.

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY
CHIPMAN,

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT JANICE
MILLER, COUNTERCLAIM AND
REQUEST FOR RULE 11
SANCTIONS

Plaintiffs,
tfC

vs.
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON
and KIM ANDERSON,

Case No. 950400145
Judge Guy R. Bumingham

Defendants.
ANSWER
COMES NOW the defendant Janice Miller and answers the Complaint of the plaintiffs
on file herein and admits, denies and alleges as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
There has been an accord and satisfaction in connection with this matter, since the
defendant Janice Miller has tendered a quit claim deed signed by her on the 14th day of April,

eeco^d cM-^\

33

1995, to the plaintiffs through their counsel. Said quit claim deed was prepared by plaintiffs'
counsel.
SECOND DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' counsel has required defendant Janice Miller to file this Answer on the basis
that plaintiffs' counsel still believes that there exists a right to attorney fees on behalf of
plaintiffs under § 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. See affidavit of Craig
M. Snyder attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
THIRD DEFENSE
1.

This defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of

the plaintiffs' Complaint,
2.

This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the plaintiffs'

Complaint.
3.

Answering paragraph 6 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, this defendant realleges and

incorporates by reference her answer to the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 5 of
the plaintiffs' Complaint.
4.

This defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,

12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20 of the plaintiffs' Compliant.
5.

This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 19 of the plaintiffs'

Complaint.

2

3

6.

Answering paragraph 21 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, this defendant realleges

and incorporates herein by reference each and every response made by this defendant to
paragraphs 1 through 20 of the plaintiffs' Complaint*
7.

Answering paragraph 22 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, this defendant alleges that

she asserts no defense to this action, and that her only response to this action has been in good
faith to seek the advice of counsel and to provide the plaintiffs with a quit claim deed concerning
the property in question, even though that property is not described by the plaintiffs in their
Complaint. This defendant further alleges that she has acquiesced in and agreed with every
request made by the plaintiffs in their First Cause of Action and only disputes the claim of the
plaintiffs to attorney f^c$ under § 78-27-56, This defendant denies that plaintiffs are entitled to
attorney fees in this matter.
8.

This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 23 of the plaintiffs'

Complaint.
WHEREFORE, this defendant prays that plaintiffs take nothing by way of the Second
Cause of Action of their Complaint, that the plaintiffs be awarded the relief sought by their First
Cause of Action, and that this defendant be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred in this
action in accordance with the allegations contained in the attached Counterclaim, together with
such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper in these premises.

3

COUNTERCLAIM
COMES NOW the defendant Janice Miller and counterclaims against the plaintiffs and
for cause of action alleges:
1•

This defendant has been required by counsel for the plaintiffs to file an answer

to the Second Cause of Action of plaintiffs' Complaint. (See Affidavit of Craig M. Snyder
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.)
2.

Said request on behalf of plaintiffs' counsel is without merit and is not brought

or asserted in good faith.
3.

The request of plaintiffs made through their counsel is frivolous and made

contrary to the provisions of § 78-27-56.
4.

Counsel for this defendant has previously informed counsel for plaintiffs that

this defendant has acquiesced in and consented to all of the relief claimed in plaintiffs' First
Cause of Action, and that this defendant had signed a quit claim deed prepared by counsel for
the plaintiffs and that counsel for this defendant has delivered that quit claim deed to counsel for
the plaintiffs on April 18, 1995, or by mail as requested by counsel for the plaintiffs.
5.

Said request for attorney fees violates the provisions of Rule 11 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure and is designed to harass, cause unnecessary delay or to needlessly
increase the cost of litigation.
6.

This defendant is entitled to her attorney fees and court costs incurred herein

in being forced to respond to the request for attorney fees and in accordance with the provisions
4

of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 178-27-56 of the Utah Code Annotated.
WHEREFORE, this defendant prays that the Court award her attorney fees and court
costs in accordance with the provisions of § 78-27-56 and/or Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, together with such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper
in these premises.
DATED this 1%

day of April, 1995.

CRAIG M. SNYDER, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendants

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this /c

day of April, 1995.

Gordon Duval
Harding & Associates
UO South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062

-3*
JL"^7**
SECRETARY
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have never had any claim or deed to the disputed property and never should have been a party
to this action. Furthermore, counsel for the Andersons notified the plaintiffs by telephone and
later in writing that the Andersons claimed no interest in the disputed property. Memorandum
in Support of Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Attorney's Fees, Exhibit K (fax from Mr. Snyder to
Mr. DuVal, dated April 14, 1995). For all the above reasons, the defendants should be awarded
their attorney fees and costs and sanctions in accordance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
DATED this ^

day of May, 1995.

CRAIG M. SNYDER, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendants

v^eco'ol
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GORDON DUVAL — No. 6532
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 785-5350
IN THE POURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE 07 UTAH
STIPULATED ORDER FOR
DISMISSAL OF TWO
DEFENDANTS

CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 950400145
Judge

JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON, and
KIM ANDERSON.
Defendants.

The parties hereby agree that Dana Anderson and Kim Anderson
should be dismissed from this litigation.

This dismissal shall be

with prejudice.
DATED this

20

day of April, 1995.
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

h»kfri na**-!! .

GORDON DUVAL
DATED this

day of April, 1995.

CRAIG SNYDER

nisc-pldgs-7\chipMn\stip-ord.dMi

gccord- OJr \\3

EXHIBfL-Q. - 3°l

1

„

2 II

ORDER
Based upon the above stipulation of the parties, IT IS HEREBY

3 ii ORDERED that Dana and Kim Anderson be dismissed from this
4 |l litigation.

DATED this

5
6

This dismissal is with prejudice.

„

day of April, 1995.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

7
8
GUY R. BURNINGHAM

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
>1
!2
3
4

4-0
misc-pLdgs-AchipMn\stip-ord.dsa

MAILING CERTIFICATE

1

I certify that a true and correct copy of the STIPULATED ORDER
2 FOR DISMISSAL was mailed the /0+~~€&{ of April, 1995, postage
prepaid, to:
3
M. SNYDER
4 CRAIG
120 East 300 North
Provo, UT 84606
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN,
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. 950400145

vs.

RULING

JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON and
KIM ANDERSON,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 on Cross Motions for
Attorney's fees. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and
upon being advised in the premises, now makes the following:
RULING
1.

Pursuant to UCA § 78-27-56, Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees is DENIED

and Defendant's request for attorney's fees is GRANTED in the amount of $484.00.

Counsel for die Defendant is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this
///
///
///
///
///

Ott. 2 e tr:

-Record

03 \1°\

4 A

ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the
Court for signature.

Dated t h i s ^ d a y of July, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

Gordon Duval, Esq.
Craig M. Snyder, Esq.

Ruling Page -2-

CRAIG M. SNYDER (3033), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 23,152

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY
CHIPMAN,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Case No. 950400145

vs.
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON
and KIM ANDERSON,
Defendants.
This matter came on regularly before the court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501,
the Code of Judicial Administration on Cross Motions each seeking an award of attorney's fees.
The court has reviewed the motions made by both parties as considered the memoranda and
affidavits submitted by counsel and after reviewing the pleadings on file herein and being fully
advised in the premises does now make and enter the following order and judgment. It is hereby
ordered adjudged and decreed:
1.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56, plaintiffs* request for attorney's

fees is denied.

Record <& i4^

M-

2.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56, defendants' request for attorney's

fees is granted and defendants are awarded judgment against the plaintiffs in the amount of
$484.00.
3.

Said judgment shall accrue interest at the legal rate of 9.22% from date hereof

until paid in full.
DATED this

day of August, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

GUY R. BURNINGHAM
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

GORDOJfDUVAL, for:
HARDING & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiffs
J:\CMS\MILLER.ORD

2
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COUHTf

GORDON DUVAL — No. 6532

1 DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, L . L . C .
P II A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f s
" 110 S o u t h Main S t r e e t
P l e a s a n t G r o v e , Utah 84062
3 Telephone:
(801) 785-5350

4

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

5
6

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF
OBJECTIONS TO THE
PROPOSED ORDER AND
JUDGMENT

|| CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN,

7

Plaintiffs,

8

vs.
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON, and
9 KIM ANDERSON.
10

Civil No. 950400145
Judge Guy Burningham

Defendants.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

This court has issued a ruling denying the plaintiffs' motion for
attorney's fees and granting the defendants' motion for attorney's
fees.

The

defendants

have

proposed

incorporating this court's ruling.

an

order

(Attached.)

and

judgment

The plaintiffs'

objection is that neither the ruling, the order, nor the judgment
|| contain any findings of fact, conclusions of law, or other reasoning

18

that would allow the plaintiffs to evaluate whether an appeal is

19

appropriate.

20

There is no Evidence of Bad Faith as is Required by S78-27-56.

21

The court has articulated no facts evidencing the Chipmans acted in

22
23
24

bad faith.

The plaintiffs do not believe there are any such facts.

They do not believe they acted in bad faith. They filed suit against
the defendants to clear title to property that has been owned by
their family for decades.
raise-pi dgs-9\chipman\obj .mem

The plaintiffs worked for many months
1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

trying to obtain from the defendants the documents necessary to clear
title to the plaintiffs' land.

Only after many months of fruitless

negotiation with the defendants did the plaintiffs file suit.

Even

after a written demand letter detailing the extreme weakness of the
defendants' legal position, the defendants would not respond or
provide the required documents. The plaintiffs had no option but to
file litigation to clear the title on their property.

The Chipmans

patiently acted in good faith for many months trying to obtain clear
title to their property short of litigation, and in filing suit they
were similarly acting in good faith.
The naming of the Andersons as defendants was not an action
prompted by or evidence of bad faith. As the minutes of the American
Fork Planning Commission reveal, there was a dispute between the
Andersons and the Chipmans as to ownership of the land adjacent to
the fence line.

Demand letters were sent to the Andersons asking

them to sign documents indicating they no longer claimed ownership of
the Chipmans' land.

The Andersons did not even respond.

Instead,

their mother-in-law adamantly asserted on their behalf that they
would not relinquish control of that land short of litigation. Based
upon the Andersons' silence and the representations of co-defendant
Miller, the Chipmans named Andersons in the lawsuit.

Once the

Andersons, through their attorney, provided written documentation
that the Andersons were no longer asserting interest in the disputed
property, the Chipmans promptly dismissed the Andersons from the

misc-pldgs-9\chipraan\obj .mem

2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

litigation.

These actions do not indicate bad faith on the part of

the Chipmans.
Defendant Miller also claimed an entitlement to attorney's fees
based upon the fact that she filed an answer in this case.

The

defendant filed an answer even though she was given four extensions
of time to answer, the last one being given specifically so the
plaintiffs and their attorney could discuss ways to resolve this
issue short of continued litigation.
The Plaintiffs did

not Advance

Frivolous

Litigation.

The

plaintiffs do not believe the actions they took resulted in frivolous
litigation. They filed a complaint only after they had exhausted all
other avenues over the course of many months. Similarly, they filed
a motion for attorney's fees only in response to the defendants'
motion for attorney's fees and sanctions.

Admittedly there are no

Utah cases holding that pre-litigation attorney's fees can be awarded
pursuant to Section 78-27-56.

But on the other hand, neither are

there any Utah cases holding that pre-litigation attorney's fees can
NOT be awarded pursuant to Section 78-27-56.

Indeed, there are two

ALR annotations citing numerous cases from other state and federal
jurisdictions where pre-litigation costs have been awarded pursuant
to statutes similar to Section 78-27-56.

The plaintiffs cited

numerous cases in support of their position while the defendants did
not rebut the cases

identified

by the plaintiffs

nor did the

defendants cite other cases in opposition to the position advanced by
the plaintiffs.
misc-pldgs-9\chipman\obj.mem

The plaintiffs do not believe it is frivolous to
3

^T0

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

advance

arguments

recognized

and

discussed

at

length

in

ALR

citations.
Attorney's Fees can Only be Awarded to the Prevailing Party.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56 states:

"In civil actions, the

court shall award attorney's fees to a prevailing party . . . ." No
where in the Utah Code or in Utah cases is there authority for
awarding attorney's fees to the losing party.
Chipmans are the prevailing party.

In this case the

They filed a complaint so they

could obtain the quit-claim deed they were entitled to.

They

obtained that deed through the litigation and are thus the prevailing
party.

The defendants did not prevail on any substantive claim or

counter-claim.

As the losing party the defendants have no claim or

right to attorney's fees.
An Award of Attorney's Fees Should be Made on the Basis of
Findings

of

Fact

Supported

by

the

Evidence

and

Appropriate

Conclusions of Law. Almost every Utah court faced with the issue of
whether a trial judge must submit findings of fact and conclusions of
law with an award or denial of attorney's fees has found that the
trial judge should enter those findings and conclusions.

For

example, in Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985), the
Supreme Court held that "attorney fees should be awarded on the basis
of evidence and that findings of fact should be made which support
the award."

The Court of Appeals "has reversed attorney fee awards

when the trial court failed to make appropriate findings of fact and
conclusions of law."
Misc-pldgs-9\chipman\obj.neffl

See, e.g.. Saunders v. Sharp. 818 P.2d 574
4

(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Similarly, in In re Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238 (Utah

1

2 Ct. App. 1989) , the Court of Appeals was compelled to remand the case
~ to the trial court because of "[t]he absence in the record before us
. of findings and conclusions on the issue of attorney fees . . . ."
r Id.

In

this

case,

plaintiffs

are

unable

to

evaluate

the

fi

appropriateness of an appeal without findings of fact and conclusions

7„

of law from this court.

o II
Q

Request for a Hearing or Written Explanation.

Before this case

comes to an end by way of a final judgment, the plaintiffs need some
reasoning or other legal analysis the court's position on this issue.
Alternatively, if the court would allow a hearing to explain the
basis for the court's decision, then detailed written findings of
fact and conclusions of law may be unnecessary.
In conclusion, the plaintiffs object to the proposed order and
judgment in that neither the proposed order and judgment nor the
ruling identify any facts or other basis for evaluating whether or

18

DATED t h i s

liT day o f S e p t e m b e r ,

1995.

DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, L . L . C .

19
20
21

GORDON DUVAL

22
23
24
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GORDON DUVAL —

No. 6532

1 DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, L.L.C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
2 110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah

84062

3 Telephone: (801) 785-5350
4
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
5
6

Plaintiffs,

7
8

PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST
FOR A HEARING

CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN,

vs.
Civil No. 950400145

JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON, and
9 KIM ANDERSON.

10

Judge Guy Burningham

Defendants.

11
12
13
14
15

Before this case comes to an end by way of a final judgment,
plaintiffs request a hearing to verify the basis of the court's
decision.
DATED September

lS~

. 1995.
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, L.L.C.

16
17

(r^./)s*~
Qu^^S^
GORDON DUVAL

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

1
2

3

,.
I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF
I OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed, postage
prepaid, September /< . 1995, to:
CRAIG SNYDER

4 120 East 300 North
5

Provo, UT

84606

FAY AND CURTIS CHIPMAN

6 1105 North 150 West
7

American Fork, UT

84003

8
9
10

SECRETARY

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*

CURTIS

*

*

CHIPMAN
Plaintiff,

vs.

Civil No, 950400145
HEARING

JANICE

TRANSCRIPT

MILLER

Defendant

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 5th day of
O c t o b e r . 1 9 9 5 , the HEARING in the above-entitled
was taken by Video Tape
nd

matter

before the Honorable Guy Burningham

was transcribed by Richard C. T . t t o n . a Certified

Public in and for the State
Shorthand Reporter and Notary
u , j(,i,i District Court Building,
of Utah at the Fourth J u d i c a l District
Provo, Utah 84601 .

53
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1

A P P E A R A N C E S

1

2
3
4
5

For the

Plaintiff;

6

Mr. Gordon Duval
Attorney a t Law
110 South Main S t r e e t
Pleasant Gorve, Utah 84062

7
8

9
10
11
12

For the Defendant:

13

Mr. Craig Snyder
Attorney at Law
Provo, Utah 84601

14
15
16
17

PRO C

E I I H i ^

18
19
THE COURT:

20

21
22
23
24
25

tape today.
Chipman

We are making our record on video

We are here on

v s . Oanice Mil ler.

File Number 950400145, Curtis
We are here on P l a i n t i f f s

, . f . s e e , there is an objection to a ruling and order and
then

revested

a hearing.

From the m e m o , it sounds like

you want to reargue what we did before.

Why don't you c . ^

5^
C-2

1

here and state exactly what it is, M r . Duval, you would

2

like this court to do or to c o n s i d e r .

3

MR. DUVAL:

4

what the court ruled

5

Before

6

options w e r e , I needed to understand

7

and Conclusions

8

eventual

9

Thank you, Your Honor.

We understand

but just didn't understand

why.

I could accurately advise my client onto what their
some of the Findings

that led to the court's analysis and

ruling.

We did not believe

there was evidence in the file

10

of bad faith nor that the defendants had prevailed nor did

11

we think that the arguments that were advanced

12

frivolous

13

cases that we have researched

14

There is a significant volume of law, not necessarily

15

this s t a t e , but other states and we just need to understand

16

the basis for the court's

17
18

.

were

I have here, these are the ALR Citations, and

THE COURT:

in preparing the m e m o s .
from

ruling.

I think I can try to do that for y o u .

M r . Snyder any comment you wanted to make?

19

MR. SNYDER:

I don't think there is any comment

20

I would make other than what I have indicated

21

that I submitted and the response that I made to Mr. Duval'

22

original

in the briefs

pleadings and m o t i o n s .

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SNYDER:

25

THE COURT:

As I read 7827-56.
Well, y e s , but before that.

78-40-3

££L
C-3

1

In the defendant's disclaimer of any interest in the

2

p r o p e r t y , the statute says that plaintiff cannot

3

costs,

4

that you m a d e , w e l l , that is because they said that they

5

weren't going to claim any i n t e r e s t , we

6

to go ahead and file a lawsuit a n y w a y .

7

make a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n whether you file a lawsuit or

8

not.

9

a r g u m e n t that I recall you having made to me, is that

And based on that and

recover

I understand the argument

ended up having
This statute doesn

The fact that they may have again taking your

10

they drug their feet and caused you problems and so you fi

11

a lawsuit.

12

H o w e v e r , their answer did disclaim any interest

13

in the p r o p e r t y .

14

you from getting any costs.

15

for attorney fees and c o s t s , and I recall the, I think it

16

was an affidavit in support of that, there were over

17

$ 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 worth of attorney fees and costs on this

18

thing which did seem excessive to the court.

And under 78-40-3 that

precluded

So when you filed your motion

19

I guess one of the compelling arguments that was

20

p e r s u a s i v e to me was in, I think it was the counter

21

a f f i d a v i t of M r . Snyder, if I can find that.

22

filed with the court on

23

fourth page of that in what is Paragraph 6 Sub "J", he

24

pointed out, as he went through your affidavit and I did

25

as w e l l . On April

It was

June the 12th of 1 9 9 5 , on the

the 11th of 1995 y o u , Mr. D u v a l , spent

5\J

C-4

1 I

$25,00 worth of time or approximately 12 minutes 1n your

2

hourly billing reviewing the merits

3

for attorney fees.

4

Snyder,

5

that you spent approximately 12 minutes making a legal

6

determination that you are entitled to attorney fees and

7

costs totalling more than $ 3 3 0 0 . 0 0 .

8
9

for the claims

This is a parenthetical

note of M r .

He says that he found it extremely

interesting

As we got here and I looked at 78-40-3:it

appeared

to me that you wouldn't be entitled to the costs

associated

10

with this m a t t e r .

11

and cross motion for attorney fees under 78-27-56 that

12

because I did award some attorney f e e s .

13

how I arrived at those attorney fees.

14

It was on that basis and on the motion

And let me explain

M r . Snyder in his affidavit for attorney fees in

15

Paragraph 8, I didn't allow him fees for the conference

16

and review pleadings that occurred

17

that were prepared in April.

18

him were in May which was the opposition that he had to

19

file to your motion

20

of the pleadings and proofing of the brief which was May

21

5th of 1995,

22

was also May the 5th of 1995 and then the pleadings to

23

reply to the motion which was on the 8th of May of 1995,

24
25

in March nor pleadings

The only fees I allowed

for attorney fees, and for his review

The memorandum that he submitted which

if my calculations are correct, those four numbers
were $ 1 6 5 , 0 0 , $93.75, $69.00, $156.25, and when I totalled

51
C-5

5

1

those they added up to $ 4 8 4 , 0 0 , and so because he was the

2

prevailing party on that m o t i o n , I gave him

3

fees that were generated to respond to that motion, nothing

4

else.

5

on m o t i o n s , I don't make findings of fact and conclusions

6

of law. That is all they are is m o t i o n s .

7

they are just overruled or s u s t a i n e d .

8

arrived at it.

9

So that was the basis of my r u l i n g .

simply the

Normally

Many times

That is how I

In fairness and if you want to have that articulated

10

in some findings since I did ask M r . Snyder to prepare

11

t h o s e , he could augment that, make the findings that I have

12

just made and then submit them to you for approval as to

13

form, and to the court for s i g n a t u r e .

14

have anything that you may need, at least, as far as my

15

basis for reaching

16

you want to appeal it for $480.00 attorney f e e s .

17

the conclusions

MR. DUVAL:

I think then you wou

I did, if you decide

Thank y o u , Your Honor, that would be

18

helpful.

19

25 m i n u t e s , I have four different memos to law clerks beforj!

20

the complaint was ever filed regarding whether or not

21

they would be entitled to attorney f e e s .

22

s i g n i f i c a n t research. And matter of fact,part of that

23

$ 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 was research on the issue of attorney fees before

24

So I think the issue of the s t a t u t e , I don't know that therje

25

is any cases that show

I think the reference to the one citation

for

So there was

that we were not seeking relief

31
C-6

1

pursuant to a statute,

2

to the bad faith statute and not a specific

3

relating to a quiet title a c t i o n .

4

while that statute would apply to quiet title a c t i o n s , it is|

5

not even what we filed.

6

j u d g m e n t on a boundary line issue, boundary by a c q u i e s c e n c e

7

and so

8
9

We were seeking relief pursuant
statute

So that is why

We asked for a declaratory

that - THE COURT:

W e l l , but the affect of that at

least my interpretation of that is you were attempting

10

to quiet title in the property that is in d i s p u t e .

11

the defendant backed off and said we are not claiming any

12

interest in it, you know, you can have it, that is what that}

13

s t a t u t e really is designed,

14

you money and time from having to go ahead and fight

15

about it once you filed your

16
17
18

I t h i n k , to d o .

When

It is to save

pleadings.

Now if I have m i s u n d e r s t o o d anything either one or both)
of you ought to correct m e .
MR. DUVAL:

Why I think in a quiet title action

19

there is that element of quieting title as

to two

parties

20

but there is also to all the world if anybody has an

21

in that land.

22

fees to all the world when maybe a party is not

23

a f f i r m a t i v e l y , aggressively asserting aninterest in the Ian P.

24

as was the case with this p a r t i c u l a r person.

25

there are different policy reasons between why tn a quiet

interest

So it would be unfair to assess attorney

So I think thjat

5<?
C-7

1

title statute they would say that you can't get

2

fees against everybody that you may have named

3

they may not be asserting an interest
THE COURT:

4

attorney
because

in that,

W e l l , yes I understand that as w e l l .

5

As I went through the m e m o r a n d u m

or the a f f i d a v i t s , excuse

6

m e , the affidavit of a t t o r n e y f e e s , you know I kind of askecj

7

m y s e l f was all of this n e c e s s a r y

8

o c c u r r i n g must the answer had been filed.

9

understand

in light of what was
And so I

that a lot of time was spent in preparation

10

of this but in light of that statute that was the basis

11

that

12

party because you didn't have to fight for it very

13

and that is what the statute

I wouldn't award a t t o r n e y fees to you as a prevailing
hard,

says,

14

MR. SNYDER:

I t h i n k , just to add. This is clearly

15

a quiet title action.

16

that title to the disputed

17

p l a i n t i f f s under the d o c t r i n e of boundary by a c q u i e s c e n c e .

18

It is clearly a quiet title action whatever theory you intejid

19

to quite the title by w h e t h e r it is a c q u i e s c e n c e ,

20

it is some other theory, you are quieting title to the

21

property.

22

of these parties have never claimed an interest to the

23

p r o p e r t y that is in q u e s t i o n , never have and never

24

M r s . Miller did but then a f t e r consulting with

25

determined

Paragraph 20 of the complaint

says

land should be quieted to the

whether

The statute c l e a r l y applies and you know two

did.

counsel

that claim was not a p p r o p r i a t e and withdrew

it.

lno
C-8

8

1

M r . Duval was informed of that,

2

THE COURT:

Anything else M r . Duval that you can

3

go ahead and make your record today,

4

Snyder make the findings that

5

M R S . CHIPMAN:

6

THE C O U R T :

I have indicated

Why don't you consult with M r . D u v a l .

This isn't an evidentiary hearing

8

M R S . CHIPMAN:

10

today.

Such lies I can't believe it.

She just give up that property, give up that property with
no f i g h t .

11
12

today.

Can I say anything at all?

7

9

I am going to have Mr.

I fought her for a whole y e a r ,
MR. DUVAL:

of t h e court's

13

I think we understand the basis

ruling,

THE C O U R T : That was the r e a s o n , again I didn't ev

14

give M r . Snyder anything as far as his defense for

15

p r e p a r a t i o n of those matters on y o u r complaint, but only

16

as to hii-m responding to to your motion for the attorney fees

17

I felt that he was the prevailing party on that m o t i o n .

18

So u n d e r 78-27-56 I thought was well t a k e n .

19

like your claim for attorney fees was well taken in light

20

of 7 8 - 4 0 - 3 .

21

MR. DUVAL:

22

also

23

and there was - -

25

THE C O U R T :
and

Your ruling m e n t i o n s 27-56 is that

then a finding of

24

I did not feel

bad faith on the Chipman's

part

27-56 is the prevailing party statute]

I - -

ui
C-9

1
2

MR. SNYDER:
asserted

3

in good faith is what it s a y s ,
THE COURT:

I didn't think it was in light of

4

78-40-3.

5

and let me read that,

6

The claim was not brought or

I just didn't think it was well taken at all

I felt like it was without m e r i t .

In ltght of

7

78-40-3 I don't think it was asserted in good faith.

8

that was the basis for the r u l i n g . Like I say let's give

9

the rationale so that you can argue that to someone and

10

So

somebody else will tell m e .

11

MR. SNYDER:

12

MR. DUVAL:

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank y o u .

13
14

(WHEREUPON, this hearing was c o n c l u d e d )

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

10
C-10
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(Ind) 474 NE2d 50S. 49 ALR4ih 819

ment in that regard is reversed. The Court of Appeals decision is
affirmed in all other respects. As is their remainder of the judgment.
GIVAN, C.J., and HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
PIVARNIK, J., not participating.
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Attorneys* fees: obduracy as basis for state-court award
I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
J

1. Introduction:
[a] Scope
[b] Related matters
S 2. Summary and c o m m e n t :
[a] Generally
jb] Practice pointers
II. OBDURACY IN PRELITIGATION CONDUCT
§

3. View tbat obduracy in prelitigation conduct cannot support
award of attorneys' fees
§ 4 . View that obduracy in prelitigation conduct can support
award of attorneys' fees:
[a] Refusing to pay monetary claim
[bj Misallocating funds
[c\ Failing to establish legal right to property before as*
suming ownership
[d] Refusing to enforce statutory rights
[e] Terminating contract
HI. OBDURACY IN CONDUCT OF T R I A L LITIGATION
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Prosecuting suit; baseless claim
Defending suit; meritless defense
Dismissing condemnation action
Failing to dismiss defendant
Objecting to motions
Protracting litigation needlessly
Obstructing court o r d e r s
Settling dispute:
(a] Settling as evidence of obduracy
( b | Refusing to sign settlement o r d e r
IV. OBDURACY IN CONDUCT OF APPEAL

§ 13. Filing frivolous appeal
§ 14. Misstating facts in appellate record
V. OBDURACY AS RELATED T O O T H E R THEORIES AS BASIS
FOR STATE C O U R T AWARD
S 15. Civil rights statutes
§ 16. Private attorney general theory

S2t

P

+

Accounting books of municipality,
M[b]
Accrual of wages by deceased,fi4[a)
Accumulation of compensatory time.
Adjoining )andowncra, herbicides, § 13
Administrative appeal, $ IS
Administrators and executors, 9 11
Adoption procedures, 5 4[d]
Advances to settle estate, § 11
Agency handling adoption of children,
M(dl
Alimony, 9 10
Allocation of funds, § 4(b)
Answer to interrogatory or petition,
HO
Appeal, conduct at, 99 13, 14
Application for retirement benefits,
9 4(a]
Arbitration panel, 9 10
Assessment on real property, 99 5, 10,
16
Assumpsit actions, 9 6
Assumption of ownership, failure to
establish legal rights, 9 4[c]
Attachment and garnishment, 9 10
Audit of municipal accounts, 9 4(b) '
Automobiles, 99 4[e], 5, 8
Bad checks, 9 3
Banks and banking, 99 4[e], 5
Baseless claims, 9 5
Bid on ofTer to buy realty, 9 11
Binding purchase agreement for property, 9 4[c)
Bonus accrued prior to death, 9 4[a]
Bookkeeping methods, 9 4[bJ
Building contract, 9 10
Bulldozing activities, 9 4[c]
Business condemnation, 9 3
Cash payment in settlement of estate,
911
Checks and drafts, 99 3. 11
Chemical herbicides,
injunction
• against, 9 13
Children, 9 4[a, d]
Cities and towns. 99 4(a, b], 5, 7, 13.
16

Civil rights, 59 4(d], 15
Civil service commission, 9 10
Claim, refusal to pay, 9 4[a]
Class action, 9 6
Clerk for municipality, financial deficiencies, | 4(b)
College faculty, reinstatement to, 9 15
Commencement of litigation, 9 3
Comment, 9 2
Compensatory time of employee, 9 4[a]
Compromise and settlement, 99 3, 5,
11. 12. 14
Condemnation of property, 99 3, 7
Condominium-hotel, building contract,
9 10
Conference, pretrial, 9 11
Conservation matters. 99 9. 13
Contracts and agreements, 99 3, 4(a,
cl. 10
Conveyance of property, 99 3, 4(cJ, 5,
11
Corporate matters, 99 3, 4|a), 5
County property taxes, 9 10
Court orders. 99 9, 11. 12fb)
Creditor's action, 99 5, 10
Cystic fibrosis, child afflicted with,
9 4[al
Dealerships, 99 5, 13
Decedents' estates, 99 4[a, b], 11, 14
Deceit, 99 3, 4lbJ, 14
Default judgments, 9 10
Default of mortgage, 9 5
Defense of suit, 9 6
Delinquent wage taxes, 9 6
Dependent children statute, 9 4[aJ
Derivative action, 9 3
Disabled persons, 9 4[a, d]
Discharge from employment, 99 4(a),
15
Discrimination, 99 4(d), 15
Dismissal of actions, 99 6-8
Divorce and separation, 99 10, 11
Drilling operations, 9 5
Easements, 9 4(cl
Education and schools, 99 4[d. el, 5.
15
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Vendor and purchaser, 99 3, 4[c], 5, 6.
10, 11
16
Training of retarded and handicapped Voluntary termination/of employment,
* 4(a. c]
persons by school district, 5 4[d]
Wages and salaries, 99 4(a, e], 6, 13
Trespass action, 5 4[c]
Trial, conduct at, 99 5*12
Welfare and public assistance, 99 4[a],
Unemployment compensation benefits.
15
«4[al
Wells, drilling operations, 9 5
Universities and Colleges, 9 15
Willful disregard ofrights,9 3
Unjust enrichment theory, 9 16
Workers' compensation benefits, 9 4[a]
Use of property, 9 4lc]
Zoning dispute, 9 13
Value of property for tax purposes,
910

Towns and cities, 99 4[a, b), 5, 7, 13,

TABLE OF JURISDICTIONS REPRESENTED
Consult POCKET PART in this volume for later cases
US: 9 16
GfeMI4[d].6. 16
Colo: 99 3. 4(dl. 5
Ind: 99 2[a. bl. 3. 4(a. c). 5, 7. 8, 14
NH: 99 2(bl. 4ta]
NJ: 9 15
I. Preliminary matters
$ 1. Introduction
(a] Scope
This annotation collects and analyzes the state cases discussing the
allowance of an award of attorneys'
fees on the basis of "obduracy" or
"obdurate" behavior or conduct by
a party or counsel to a party. Although terms such as "bad faith,"
"vexatiousness," "wantonness,"
and the like may be used by courts
discussing the "obduracy" or "obdurate behavior" concept, only
those state cases dealing specifi1. For a discussion of federal court
awards of attorneys' fees to prevailing
parties based upon an adversary's bad
830

NM:9 6
NY: 9 15
Ohio: 99 4la. b, d, e], 9, 12[a]
P.: 99 2(b), 3. 4lb], 5, 6. 9-11. 12[b),
13

cally with "obduracy," or conduct
or behavior described as "obdurate," are collected.1
A number of jurisdictions may
have rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or legislative enactments bearing upon this subject.
Since these are discussed herein
only to the extent that they are
reflected in the reported cases
within the scope of this annotation,
the reader is advised to consult the
appropriate statutory or regulatory
compilations,
[b] Related matters
Allowance of attorneys' fees in
faith, obduracy, or other misconduct,
see the annotation at 31 ALR Fed 833.
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5Ub]

mandamus
proceedings.
34
ALR4th 457.
What constitutes bad faith on
part of insurer rendering it liable
for statutory penalty imposed for
bad faith in failure to pay, or delay
in paying, insured's claim. 33
ALR4th 579.

awarding costs where both parties
prevail on affirmative claims. 66
ALR3d 1115.
Dismissal of plaintiff's action as
entitling defendant to recover attorneys' fees or costs as "prevailing
party" or "successful party." 66
ALR3d 1087.
Authority of trial judge to imValidity and construction of statpose costs or other sanctions ute or rule allowing attorneys' fees
against attorney who fails to ap- to out-of-state defendant successpear at, or proceed with, scheduled fully defending suit brought in
trial. 29 ALR4th 160.
state. 51 ALR3d 1336.
Award of attorneys' fees out of
Allowance of attorneys' fees in
trust estate in action by trustee civil contempt proceedings. 43
ALR3d 793.
against cotrustee. 24 ALR4th 624.
Attorneys' fees or other expenAuthority of divorce court to
award prospective or anticipated ses of litigation as element in meaattorneys' fees to enable parties to suring exemplary or punitive dammaintain or defend divorce suit. 22 ages. 30 ALR3d 1443.
ALR4th 407.
Attorneys' fees as element of
Continuance of civil case as con- damages in action for false imprisditioned upon applicant's payment onment or arrest, or for malicious
of costs or expenses incurred by prosecution. 21 ALR3d 1068.
other party. 9 ALR4th 1144.
Attorneys' fees incurred in litigaAward of damages for dilatory tion with third person as damages
tactics in prosecuting appeal in in action for breach of contract. 4
ALR3d 270.
state court. 91 ALR3d 661.
Items of costs of prosecution for
Right of party who is attorney
and appears for himself to award which defendant may be held. 65
of attorney's fees against opposing ALR2d 854.
party as element of costs. 78
Allowance of attorneys' fees in,
ALR3d 1119.
or other costs of, litigation by benValidity of statute allowing attor- eficiary respecting trust. 9 ALR2d
neys' fees to successful claimant 1132.
but not to defendant, or vice versa.
Award of counsel fees to prevail73ALR3d515.
ing party based on adversary's bad
Construction and application of faith, obduracy, or other misconstate statute or rule subjecting duct. 31 ALR Fed 833.
•
party making untrue allegations or
denials to payment of costs or atSpeiser, Attorneys' Fees (1973).
torneys* fees. 68 ALR3d 209.
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee:
Who is the "successful party" or Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49
"prevailing party" for purposes of Iowa L Rev 75.
831
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ing litigation will not support an
award of attorneys' fees under the
obduracy exception (S3), reasoning that prelitigation conduct giv§ 2. Summary and comment
ing rise to a potential cause of
action or lawsuit rnnnm in itstlf
[a] Generally
constitute obduracyr Many courts/ *?C
The term "obdurate" has been however, have identified 'specific
defined by Webster's dictionary as conduct by a party which occurred
"stubbornly persistent in wrongdo- prior to the filing of suit as a possiing." 1 In its legal sense, the term is ble basis for an award of attorneys'
rarely defined with such precision. fees to the adversary (§4). Courts
Cases utilizing the term, or in its have awarded attorneys' fees to a
noun form "obduracy," tend to prevailing party based upon a
freely substitute as synonymous showing that the adversary wrongterms such as "bad faith," "vexa- fully and in bad faith refused to
tiousness," wantonness," "oppres- pay a monetary claim, some rjgsiveness," and even "obstreperous- soningthat.litigation SKQUICT have
ness."* Though a precise legal defi- beenumSrcessarTjojc^^
nition of obduracy is lacking, the
state cases collected connote gen- l l e f t r t e c r T g ^
appelerally a degree of stubbornness, were not awardedwnenthe
,
a
obstinacy, or refusal to cooperate lor* cTr0fT""~wlnr 1?ioT^)^
by a litigant or his attorney which proper factual record demonstratmight warrant as a sanction an ing obduracy (§ 4[a]). Fees were
award of attorneys' fees to the op- not awarded in a case in which an
opposing party allegedly misalloposing party.
cated municipal funds, because no
T h e general rule followed fraudulent purpose for the acthroughout the United States, couniiD^-^erroTs^ was evident ^
known as the "American rule," (rflbj). Obduracy in prelitigation I
states that a litigant has no inher-f conduct warranting an award of |
em right to recover attorneys' fees,/ attorneys' fees was not found in a I
whether as costs or as damages,! case in which a party failed to 1
from an opposing litigant, in the establish legal title to an easement I
absence of statute, rule of court, oi before exercising rights of owner- 1
agreement providing otherwise A ship, because bad faith or opprei- J
An exception to the American rule^ sive and vexatious conduct were
has been recognized by state not shown (S 4fr])t Th™1gh nbrin"
courts under the circumstances of_ =*fcey-tras been alleged in cases of
obduracy outlined above.
failure by a government official Co
A few courts have held that ob- enforce statutory rights, state
duracy arising in conduct preced- courts have not awarded attorneys'

Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees
for Abuses of the Judicial System,
61 NCL Rev 613 (1983).

# *

2. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1976).
3. The latter term appears in Stech v
Panel Mart, Inc. (1982. Ind App) 434
NE2d 97. 14(a)- The others appear
•32

with regularity throughout the cases
collected.
4. See 1 Spciser, Attorneys' Fees,
IS 12.3 and 12.4 (1973).
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fees based upon obduracy under
either state law (§ 4[d]) or the federal civil rights statutes (§ 15).
Mere termination of an employment contract, absent a showing of
bad faith, did not constitute sufficient obduracy to allow an award
of fees to the terminated employee
(*4[e]).
State courts addressing the issue
more often have found obduracy
warranting imposition of attorneys'
fees in conduct occurring during
litigation, as opposed to conduct
occurring before the litigation process begins. Courts have held that
the obduracy exception is an appropriate remedy to compensate a
defendant dragged into baseless
litigation through prosecution of a
merittess lawsuit, though mere allegations that particular claims were
meritless or baseless did not suffice
to justify an award as a sanction
unless obduracy in presenting the
claims was also shown (§ 5). Similarly, an award of attorneys' fees
based on obduracy has been made
against an attorney who knowingly
argued entirely meritless defenses,
but was denied in a case in which a
party presented an unfounded defense, but was not shown to have
done so in bad faith (§ 6). Dismissal of a condemnation proceeding by the condemnor did not warrant an award of fees to the party
whose properly was threatened
with condemnation, when the dismissal was not made in bad faith
(I 7). Failure of a plaintiff to dismiss a codefendant from a lawsuit,
when no evidence indicated liability by the codefendant for alleged
negligence to the plaintiff, supported an award of attorneys' fees
under the obduracy exception
(§8). State courts have held that

mere objections to preliminary motions will not constitute obduracy
(59), though the cumulative effect
of a number of objections and motions resulting in the needless protraction of litigation has been held
to justify an award of attorneys'
fees under the obduracy exception
(S 10). Bad-faith obstruction of a
series of court orders has been
sanctioned by an award of attorneys' fees under the obduracy exception (§ 11). The mere fact that
parties to litigation eventually settled between themselves, when no
bad faith was evident, did not justify an award of attorneys' fees
(§ 12[a]), though a clearly unreasonable and obdurate refusal by an
attorney to sign a settlement order
has resulted in an award of fees to
the opponent (§ 12fbJ).
The filing of a frivolous appeal
could constitute obduracy within
the meaning of the exception to
the American rule, though state
courts addressing the question
have not awarded fees, finding that
the appeals were not frivolous
(§ IS). However, an attorney who
misstated facts in an appellate record, thereby consuming the time of
the court and opposing counsel,
has been sanctioned by an award
of fees to the opponent (§ 14).
A few state courts have explored
the relationship of the obduracy
concept to other conceptual bases
supporting an award of attorneys'
fees to a prevailing party. The obduracy exception, as utilized by the
federal courts in making attorneys'
fees awards made under the federal civil rights statutes, was held
not applicable to allow an award of
fees in state court when state law
did not allow such awards (§ 15),
833

«*M

O B D U R A C Y : STATE * E E AWARDS

W

AUIVtUI

49 AUMth 825

[bl P r a c t i c e p o i n t e r ^ —
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m a t t e r of b r o a d public poli c y , advocates of shifting attorneys'
fees c o n t e n d that litigants will be
d e t e r r e d from wasting limited j u d i cial resources and congesting the
courts with baseless litigation by
t h e threat of having to pay the
adversary's counsel fees. T h e count e r a r g u m e n t states that a litigant
with a potentially meritorious claim/
nx rirftiiBL shuuid not btr PimftKec
merely tor b n n g t n g o r defending a'~
lawsuit, because rights of free access to the courts may b e chilled.*
Attorneys arguing for o r against
application of the obduracy exception to the American rule in a
particular case might consider directing the court's attention to the
b r o a d e r underlying policies involved.

8. See Re Wardship of Turrin (1982.
Ind App) 436 NE2d 130. ft 4[a].

9. See, for example, Simmons v
471 A2d909. 0 6.

[

Although state courts discussing
obduracy as a basis for an award of
attorneys' fees sometimes have imp o s e d such a sanction as part of
the costs of litigation and somet i m e s as damages, as a practical
matter the courts have a t t e m p t e d
n o distinction in categorizing the
awards on this basis. However, at
least o n e court has pointed out
that because an award of attorneys'
fees as damages made u n d e r the
obduracy exception is punitive in
nature, an assessment of attorneys'
fees would not be p r o p e r against a
Counsel arguing o n appeal that party, such as a government entity,
an award of attorneys' fees should which is not liable for punitive
have b e e n allowed by the trial damages u n d e r state law. s
court d u e to o b d u r a t e behavior by
Counsel should note that courts
t h e adversary in the proceedings
below, o r prior to litigation, should have held an attorney for a party
n o t e that the decisions state that personally liable for payment of
t h e question of obduracy is a fac- the attorneys' fees of the o p p o s i n g
tual determination. For this reason, party, when the court d e t e r m i n e d
counsel should preserve the issue that actions taken by the attorney
for appeal and b e p r e p a r e d to in the conduct of litigation consti5. See Kuenzel. The Attorney's Fee:
Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 Iowa
L Rev 75.
6. See Upson v Board of Trustees
(1984) 124 NH 787. 474 A2d 582.
MM.

$ 3

7. See, for example, Griffin v New
Hampshire Dept. of Employment Secur. (1977) 117 NH 108. 370 A2d 278.
* 4(al.

point to specific trial court findings
of fact, such as findings that t h e
adversary protracted litigation,
a b u s e d the judicial process, o r o t h erwise d e m o n s t r a t e d bad faith giving rise to obduracy, when assigning trial court refusal to award
ittorneys* fees as error. T h o u g h
le appellate court might r e m a n d
>r such a factual determination, 9 it
light instead simply affirm the
rial court denial of attorneys'
ees.'

atnd a state court has held that a
showing of obduracy is unnecessary to s u p p o r t an award of attorneys' fees based u p o n t h e private
attorney general exception to the
American rule (§ 16).
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luted obduracy.* O b d u r a c y by an
attorney in bringing or defending a tion, which would otherwise allow
lawsuit also could be sanctioned an award of attorneys' fees as an
u n d e r the Model Rules of Profes- element of damages, was held insional C o n d u c t . Disciplinary Rule applicable to conduct p r e c e d i n g
7-102(A)(1) provides that an attor- t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t of litigation in
ney should not "[flile a suit, assert E. F. H u t t o n 8c C o . v A n d e r s o n
a position, [or] conduct a defense (1979) 4 2 C o l o A p p 4 9 7 . 5 9 6 P2d
413. T h e
plaintiff
had
been
. . . on behalf of his client when
awarded punitive d a m a g e s and athe knows or when it is obvious that
torneys' fees as part of a j u d g m e n t
such action would serve merely to
in a civil securities fraud lawsuit, in
harass o r maliciously injure anwhich the defendant was alleged to
o t h e r . " D i s c i p l i n a r y R u l e 7- have shown a willful, malicious,
102(A)(2) ameliorates this rule to a n d reckless disregard of the plainthe extent that a lawyer is allowed tiff's rights in paying o n an account
to make a claim o r defense unwar- with bad checks. In reviewing t h e
ranted by existing law "if it can b e defendant's claim o n appeal that
supported by good faith a r g u m e n t attorneys' fees should not have
for an extension, modification, o r been awarded, the court stated that
reversal of existing law." Clearly, in the absence of a statute o r conhowever, a trial court finding that tractual a g r e e m e n t , attorney's fees
an attorney obdurately o r in bad ordinarily a r e not recoverable as a n
faith presented a baseless claim o r element of d a m a g e s in a tort o r
defense could warrant professional contract action. Noting that the
discipline.
plaintiff c o n c e d e d that n o contractual a r r a n g e m e n t o r statute a u t h o rized the award of attorneys' fees,
I I . O b d u r a c y in p r e l i t i g a t i o n
the court found that the plaintiff
conduct
relied o n the " o b d u r a t e b e h a v i o r "
{ S. View t h a t o b d u r a c y in preliti- exception to the general rule of n o
gation c o n d u c t c a n n o t s u p - attorneys' fees. T h e court d e p o r t a w a r d of attorney!* fees
scribed the exception as allowing
Although many of the cases col- the award of attorneys' fees if t h e
lected within this annotation make losing party has acted in bad faith
no distinction between o b d u r a t e o r for oppressive reasons. Finding,
conduct occurring before the filing however, that the exception ~apof suit and o b d u r a t e conduct oc- plied^qnljLwhen tnT^aH-falth concurring after the filing of suit, the duct anefled" r e l a t e d l c T t h e p1 1r o0s1e1cution or . d e f e n s e " o j ^ ^ - J S '
'
follnwinpr rfls*»« h ^ v e JHfl* ^ E p l i r i t l y
that, o b d j u j ^ ^ c ^ m i u c T ^ o c c u r r i n ^ and thaTlt waTTi'ot contencled that
before litigatJQn^ajinc*^ support an tjje^dcfenjlant haoTTn^aRHiis^clefense IfTlbacL faith, theT court held
award of attorneys'.fees to a party
Tjbat i t j v a s ^ e r r o r ^ r _ t h e trial court
under the o b d u r a t e behavior ex- to award ^ t o r J ^ g y ^ T g e s r ^ n H reception T6"thT^Tm»n«nfir rule.
versed the j u d g i t i e n r granting the
T h e " o b d u r a t e behavior" excep- fees.

I

lia (1984) 80 Pa Cmwlth 354.

•34
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In reviewing an award of attor- dismiss jt. The court stated that
neys' fees to a plaintiff who had conOtjct such as this would constibeen granted an injunction enjoin- tute obdurate behavior upon a trial
ing the erection of a fence, the court's finding that the behavior
court in Kikkert v Krumm (1985, was vexatious and oppressive in
Ind) 474 NE2d 503. 49 ALR4th the extreme andjL^blaianLjUHise
*
819, above, held that intentional o£-the~JTroTaai"1^^
or illegal conduct that gives rise to the underlying lawsuit as an exama cause of action is not obdurate ple of the classic property dispute,
behavior within the meaning of the and stating its belief that the plainexception to the American rule re- | tiffs and defendants disputed a lequiring each party to the litigation gitimate claim of right, the court
to pay his own attorneys' fees. The found the obdurate behavior exstate Supreme Court first noted ception, as a remedy for defenthat attorneys' fees are not allowa- dants who are draggg^ into i>asck^ippIicable^AJso,
ble in the absence of a statute or in ' less litigation,
,
the absence of some agreement or the**«©«rr mM«r*Uial If it' "afiegeaiy
stipulation specifically authorizing obdurate behavior had occurred
such fees, and noted that the same before the filing o^ 'hf la™*"^
rule applied in courts of law and* ~Yj&M IflAT iiiieniioiUl d! illegal con
courts of equity. However, the duct giving rise to a cause of action
court recognized that other juris- is not obdurate behavior, but is
dictions had carved out an excep- merely conduct that may form thel
tion to the general rule through basis of a potential? lawsuit. The
the use of the court's equitable award—of ottorneys —freT
powers when a party acted in bad plaintiffs was therefore held to be
faith. Stating that the case repre- error and the judgment was resented the first time the court had versed in that regard.
considered the obdurate behavior
The court in Dotlich v Dotlich
exception to the American rule, the (1985, Ind App) 475 NE2d 331,
court defined the obdurate behav- held that the obdurate behavior
ior exception as a protective mea- exception" to ^ne American rule did
sure which operates to help pre- n g t a p p l y " to altSw^gir^rw^rtf^bf
serve the integrity of the judicial attorneys'" Fees basea"upon obduprocess. An attorney's fee award rate conduct plgcecIHifg JL Jawsuit.
made undei' H\e~ 6bduiale"'"uehavipr The underlying lawsuit was a
cxegpHonTacfordlflfe to trie court, shareholder's derivative action, and
%vU5 puflihVg in" nature ancT^cle- the directors of a corporation apjlgned"tO ftfiinbufSe" a prevailing pealed a court order directing
party wno has"Tj?en draggegUnto them to reimburse the corporation
baseless hngatiQ^JmcT^sraconse- for its attorneys' fees. The appelquence *sTibjectecftogreaTexpense. late court noted that the jurisdicTTnrSUJiiemT? CotTrTatlded Ihafthe tion generally followed the Ameriobduratcjieiiaw^r emepiioll cuille* can rule, prohibiting an award of
^in+crplayonly at the time a party/ attorneys' fees against a losing
files a knowingly baseless claim oy party, absent a statute or rule to
the contrary. However, the court
The claim is baseless and fails to noted three exceptions to the

49ALI Ith 825

American rule—the obdurate behavior, common fund, and private
attorney general exceptions. The
court defined the obdurate behavior situation as one allowing the
courts to use their equitable powers to impose costs on defendants
who behaved in bad faith, and held
that the obdurate behavior exception was the only one that conceivably could apply. Relying upon
Kikkert v Krumm (1985, Ind) 474
NE2d 503, above, for the proposition that the exception provides a
remedy for defendants dragged
into baseless litigation, the court
held that the obdurate behavior
alleged—refusal of, tne^ corporate
directors jo^ c Q , ^ g y _ P [ £ P ^ L ^ ^ ^
to the cijtrjgorafipn-^ccurrecr before the suit was iftstitiiTeTfrT6"~was
not obdj^te^elTaYtoit-^drlwr^he
meaning^T^tjie Exception". Such
conduct, according "?&• ine"" court,
merely formed,the basis of the

quested an additional attorney's
fee for their efforts expended in
obtaining payment under the
agreement. The appellate court
stated the general rule that in the
absence of a private agreement or
statutory provision to the contrary,
each party to a lawsuit must pay
his own attorneys' fees. Finding
that the settlement agreement
made no mention of the additional
attorney's fee award sought by the
petitioners, and that the applicable
eminent domain code did not authorize such an award, the court
noted that the petitioners alleged
that the redevelopment authority
had been malicious, arbitrary and
vexatious in delaying payment under the settlement agreement. The
petitioners, according to the court,
relied upon a section of the state
judicial code that entitled a participant in litigation to receive an attorney's fee as a sanction against
another participant "for dilatory,
In reviewing a dispute over en- obdurate or vexatious conduct durforcement of a settlement agree- ing the pendency of a matter." The
ment arising out of an eminent court held that the conduct of"the
domain proceeding, the court in
White v Redevelopment Authority
of McKeesport (1982) 69 Pa
Cmwlth 307, 451 A2d 17, held that
a statute awarding attorneys' fees
to a party when the other party tion" jfosglyiTri _V^peTT^to the
exhibited obdurate conduct during settlemem^gre^menTtliini^ tfJeTpethe pendency of a suit did noj titioners^Jiled Tfieir petition. Also,
apply to conduct preceding the fil- trie couTPrTtft^cTtrrai delay in making j>r suiT ^Tne~ local^reaevelbp- ing payment under the agreement
"Vrient authority and the petitioners was not "dilatory, obdurate or vexhad entered into an agreement atious conduct" relative to the unconcerning condemnation of the derlying eminent domain proceedpetitioners' business and reim- ings. Stating that it could "by no
bursement for relocation expenses. means applaud the Authority's conWhen the redevelopment authority duct relative to its agreement," the
made no payments after 2 years, court held that nevertheless an
the petitioners petitioned the court award of attorneys' fees could not
to enforce the settlement, and re- be made under the state statute, so
837
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the trial court order denying relief
was affirmed.
$ 4. View that obduracy in prelitigation c o n d u c t can support
award o f attorneys' fees
[a]

Refusing
claim

to

pay

monetary

In (he following cases, prcftcigation refusal by a party to pay a
monetary claim was held by the
courts to constitute obdurate behavior such as would support an
award of attorneys' fees made under the obduracy exception.

to and withheld payment from the
plaintiff. The court noted the general rule that each party to the
litigation pays his own counsel
fees, and the obdurate behavior
exception, under which the court
uses its equitable powers to impose
costs on a defendant who has behaved in bad faith. However, finding that the proper amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded was
not supported by sufficient e v k ,
dencc, the court reversed
wMxip'
rnanded.1*
^
0

In reviewing an award o f attorneys' fees made under the obdurate behavior exception, the cour>
in Lystarczyk v Smits (1982, Ind
App) 435 NE2d 1011, held that the
jury reasonably could have determined that the defendant had practiced oppression, fraud, or bad
faith in refusing to make payment
under a contract, thereby justifying
the award. T h e underlying suit
arose from breach of a construction contract for construction
of a
house. After a jury verdict in favor
of the plaintiff contractor, the defendant appealed the award of
damages and attorneys' fees. Stating that the jury was charged with
weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses,
and viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn
from it in the light most
favorable
to the defendant, the court found
that the jury could reasonably have
inferred that the defendant, in bad
faith, attempted to delay payment

In reviewing a lawsuit/brought
by a city employee t? recover
wages, the court in Logansport v
Remley (1983, Ind App) 4 5 3 NE2d
326, held that failure of the city to
pay an employee compensatory
time was properly determined by
the trial court to constitute obdurate behavior, and such behavior
warranted an award of attorneys'
fees to the employee. According to
the court, testimony at the trial
showed that the employee was dismissed by the city in order to avoid
having to pay her compensatory
time wages. Although the court
noted that the evidence was conflicting as to whether the employee
left her employment voluntarily or
was fired, it held that the trial
court, as a finder of fact, had made
the inference that she was fired,
and would not be reversed o n this
factual determination.
Further, the
court stated that it believed the
conduct of city officials clearly constituted obdurate behavior. T h e
court found that the employee was

10. More recent Indiana decisions
indicate that the jurisdiction will no
longer recognize prelitigation conduct
as a basis tor an award of attorneys'
fees under the obduracy exception. See

Kikkcrt v Krumm (1985. Ind) 474
NE2d 503, 49 ALR4th 819, and Dotlich v Dotlich (1985. Ind App) 475
NE2d33!,bothat$3.
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fired after city officials discovered
that she accumulated more compensatory time hours than they had
previously contemplated, and apparently decided that the only expedient solution was to fire her.
The court stated that it would not
sanction conduct which amounted
to an attempt by the city to alter
the terms of a contract. Characterizing the award of attorneys' fees
under the obdurate behavior exception as a "punitive; imposition,"
the court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to attorneys' fees under
the obdurate behavior exception,
and affirmed.11
The state Supreme Court in
Harkeem v Adams (1977) 117 N H
687. 377 A2d 617, e x p l i c j t i v e i t
dorsed a n award o f aTTorne^s fees
to ;T prevluTuiF^partv^rjaseiri on Hi«
played oj^dl^Sy^gLih^ othe?r party
in^reimKatibn^onduct. 1 he plainliflirrthe original suit had sought
unemployment compensation benefits from the state department of
employment security, and his benefits were denied. T h e plaintiff repeatedly attempted to claim his
benefits by various administrative
avenues, but was unsuccessful. A
trial court eventually awarded the
plaintiff the benefits he sought, and
additionally awarded counsel fees
in the amount of one-third of the
recovery. O n appeal, the defendant
contended that the court could not
award attorneys* fees in a case of

**w

bad-faith conduct, and that even if
it could, the finding of bad faith
was not properly made. T h e court
stated the general rule that parties
to litigation pay their own counsel
fees, and reasoned that the rule
sought to avoid penalizing a person for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit by entitling the
opponent to collect attorneys' fees.
Also, the court stated that the
threat o f having to pay an opponent's costs might unjustly deter
those o f limited resources from
prosecuting or defending suits.
Overriding considerations, however, would allow an award of attorneys' fees if appropriate to d o
justice and vindicate rights, according to the court. Citing numerous
authorities, the court defined the
bad-faith conduct necessary to justify an award of attorneys' fees as
including situations in which a
party has acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons," conduct characterized as
unreasonably obdurate or obstinate, or cases in which it should
have Been jinn^e^sary~tor~lrie"successful^^q^To^hav^b'rougnt the
j c t i o n . The"^a)u7rHuYrtKet noted
thai an^ward of attorne
the basisjaLbad •fratflTwas appropri
aj^ttTcases in which an individual
was forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined
and established right, which should
have been freely enjoyed without
judicial intervention. Under thts^TS^

i

11. The court defined the nliilm iij__ dwfnlTTfis
i iinln in that the jurisbehavior required to bring the obdu- diction will no longer recognize prelitirate behavior exception into play as gation conduct as a basis for an award
conduct of a party which is "vexatious , of attorneys' fees under the obduracy
and oppressive in the extreme," citing exception. Sec Kikkert v Krumm (1985,
St. Joseph's College v Morrison, Inc. "ind) 474 NE2d 503, 49 AUUth 819,
(1973) 158 Ind App 272, 302 NE2d and Dotlich v Dotlich (1985. Ind App)
865, below. J l o w v t r , -niurr recent"lnr-"~475 NE2d 331. both at ft 3.
839
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tionale. according to the court, the a mechanic's lien, the court in St
>t wnat
nave been*"ah
ucm an Joseph's College v Morrison, Inc.
costs of
what snouia
should have
unnece?H^j^^yr^cc^m^€ ^-w—*•** - (1973) 158 Ind App 272, 302
shitteyTo^fee^^^gsJDle NE2d 865, held that conduct by a
mere!
party must be "vexatious and oppaHyTjJn35ngTnTs~Tatio7iaTe~pa
ulari^"appropriate in unemploy- pressive in the extreme" before the
ment compensation actions, where court would award attorneys' fees
an individual is often of limited under the obdurate behavior exmeans, the court held that an at- ception, and that this standard had
torney's fee award would further not been met in the case before it.
the policy of providing needed ac- A contractor sought to recover atcess to the courts. Concluding that torneys* fees under the slate methe plaintiff was clearly entitled to chanic's lien statute, but the court
unemployment benefits, but was held that the statute did not apply
able to obtain them only by dili- to one not entitled to foreclose a
gently pnry»it)g hi* rlaim "through mechanic's lien. Stating the general
^*n j "available legal channel before [ule of the jurisdiction that each
my to a lawsuit must pay his own
he obtained vindication," the court
held that the department of em- cbunsel fees, that an award of atployment security acted contrary to torneys' fees could not be made in
ie absence of a statute or agree*
both statute and established case
.lent, and that this rule applied
law, which clearly established the
qually in courts of law and courts
plaintifTs claim as legitimate, in
requiring the plaintiff to pursue ->f equity, the court noted exceplitigation before paying his claims. tions which had been carved out.
Determining that the department The court found the exception aphad no valid reason for denying plicable to the situation before it to
the plaintifTs benefitn, thr royrr be the obdurate behavior excepUetr-mai the department, in its tion, under which courts could use
jduratc pursuit of further fruit- their equitable powers to impose
less litigation, "showed a callous costs on defendants who behaved
d^rcgard^JQgrtfie^tgEjg of the in bad faith. Holding that__exyaorp|anuin/^an3 that as a result, a dinary circumstances other than
needlesTctrain was placed upon the me/e^aTTur^'To^-l^
resources of the slate judicial sys- claim were_necessafy"jo establish
tem. The award of attorneys* fees baa taitn uruIeT the" obdurate be*
against the department was af- Daa iaunr uuuci , mc uuuuiaiv v «
"havT75T e*geption ( and t'KafT^arty's
firmed.
conduct musT^oT>^v^xaTious and
•
Alleged prelitigation refusal by a 6m5FeiSIve"Tr^^
party to pay a monetary claim was THtable sanTuonsT^He^court held
held, in the following cases, not frlaTl-qulTylficI noTjustify an award
sufficiently proven lo constitute ob- of counsel fees in the case before
durate behavior such as would sup- it, so reversed the trial court on
port an award of attorneys' fees this ground. However, the court
under the obduracy exception.
noted that if a determination on
In reviewing an action to enforce remand showed that a valid lien
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existed, a statutory award of attor- each party must pay his own attorneys' fees would be appropriate. ,,
neys' fees in the absence of a statFinding that .he trial court had v", dJ : W W " 1 " ' o r » » P u ' a t i o n P r o "
not abused its discretion in deny' " « «>'henv,.e and that an ex:«« ^ *.ui«. r~- a »»^ raM ..* r-*- ..« ception to the rule existed when a
r
mg a claim tor attorneys tees un.
, . . ,f . . u
AH »U- ~K,I..~..- u-i* :~- -.„,.
partyJ acted in bad faith. However,
der the obdurate behavior excep- tK
. J c ^ »*w ^ r •.•.*•
h e
tion. the court in Stech v Penal
«>"« d e ? n e d b a d f a '« h . "
onducl
Mart. Inc. (1982, Ind App) 434 5
vexat.ous and oppress.ve
findm s
NE2d 97. held thatjt could not be , n , h . e e x , r e m e - l"'\co"n
«
—:A «- ^ '^o't^; Zr iZr^iU^ »•£„ on the issue of bad faith were presaid as a matter ol law that the
, ,
,
..r

piainTto5igo5i|™3ns5iSi-«° lu"!Id " ^ T "
pVlcHr^Tslale^eract^
a^Ttemsi^rrmhm^Skged
irbaTTaTar^tTTVlcr^eihe
6Wurate b ^ j g o t e x c ^ i o T r o p e r ate. The w S e r i y ^ T u T T ^ r t s e
"^Een—The plaintiff corporation
sought to purchase shares of stock.
under a stock purchase agreement.
and the defendant refused to sell
the stock at the tendered price,
The corporation then filed a declaratory judgment action. T h e
court defined the only relevant issue on appeal as whether the defendant should have been awarded
attorneys* fees due to the obdurate
behavior of the corporation in refusing to pay sums owed to her
and to the estate, the salary and
bonus accrued by the deceased
prior to his death. Stating that the
trial court found on the evidence
no unreasonable delay giving rise
to " o b s t r e p e r o u s n e s s " which
12. More
recent
decisions
would
call for
an Indiana
award of
attorindicate
thatorthe
jurisdiction
will the
no
neys' fees
punitive
damages,
longer
recognize
prelitigation
conduct
court noted the general rule that
as a basis for an award of attorneys'
fees under the obduracy exception. See
Kikkert v Krumm (1985, Ind) 474
NE2d 503, 49 ALR4th 819, and Dotlich v Dotlich (1985, Ind App) 475
NE2d331,bothat§3.

a n d

TH "ol

*? disturbed .f supported by ev.°.f probative value. Because
* * , n a l co "f« . h a d
™****"
™ d ™ c e a n d >"*««* l*!e ^ d . b . l u y
o f ,he
a d
h
""""»"• " < < ' " " "
p r i n t e d were complex, the court
, f o u 1 , d n o a b u 5 r c °f d « c r « ' ° " » t h e
«™1 court refusal to award attor" ' v s fee,, a n d h ' l d « h a ' " ? « « « " of law, .1 could not be sa.d that
»hf corporat.on had a c . e d . n bad
fe.th dunng the d.spute. The case
wa
» affi7"ed " P " * - reversed , n
P a r t - a n d «•»**»««•"
A trial court award of attorneys'
fees assessed under the obduracy
theory against a state public welfare department was reversed by
the court in Re Wardship of Turrin
(1982, Ind App) 436 NE2d 130,
because the court_determined as a
matter of fact thalLthe^eparTment
ha j ^ n o j ^ d r a g g e d j o s t e r p a r e n t s
into baseless" ntigatioriTiTrefusing
to13.
payMore
monetary
incurred
recent amounts
Indiana decisions
indicate
that the jurisdiction will
jnJ«uinj£To^^
T hno
e
longer
recognize of"
prelitigation
conduct
foster ^areruT
a ^cHilcf afflicted
as a basis for an award of attorneys'
fees under the obduracy exception. See
Kikkert v Krumm (1985, Ind) 474
NE2d 503, 49 ALR4th 819, and Dotlich v Dotlich (1985, Ind App) 475
NE2d3Sl.bothat ( 3 .
dence
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with cyscic fibrosis petitioned the
state for reimbursement of various
monetary amounts incurred as expenses in foster care. As part of
the petition, the foster parents
sought reimbursement of their attorneys' fees, and the fees were
awarded against the welfare department. Finding that no portion
of the applicable dependent children statute granted attorneys* fees
to foster parents, and finding no
agreement between the parties
providing for attorneys' fees, the
court cited Cox v Ubik (1981, Ind
App) 424 NE2d 127. 5 8. for recognition of the obdurate behavior
exception to the general rule that
no attorneys* fees could be
awarded absent statute or agreement. This exception, according to
the court, was based on bad-faith
actions by a party which were ''vexatious and oppressive in the extreme." Noting that the bad faith

14. The court also held that because
an award of attorneys' fees made on
the basis of the obdurate behavior exception was punitive in nature, and the
welfare department was a governmental entity, attorneys' fees, as punitive
damages, could not be assessed, under
the reasoning of State v Denny (1980)
273 Ind 556. 406 NE2d 240. Also, as
•42

original demand for compensation
from the welfare department and
that the court had denied their
request for other expenses, and
these denials were not challenged
on appeal. Concluding that the
welfare department's initial denial
of the claims for reimbursement
had merit and so was not baseless,
the court determined that the obdurate behavior exception did not
apply.14
In reviewing an action disputing
entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits, the court in
Griffin v New Hampshire Dept. of
Employment Secure. (1977) 117
NH 108, 370 A2d 278, held that
absent a finjjingL^ajjhedejendant
3eme<ri>ei^
neys^eeTjvould JQI j * ^ j * y d e d l o
tfuTjnsyntjin^
wej^rtne
plaintiFTs unem_exception.
_ j u o n : J [The
h e plaintiH
ployment compensation benefits
were discontinued by the state, and
he appealed. The trial court found
that the plaintiff was entitled to the
benefits, and awarded the plaintiff
attorneys' fees to be paid by the
stale department of employment
security, reasoning that an unemployed worker should not have to
pay attorneys' fees in order to secure unemployment compensation
to which he is entitled under law.
Amici curiae to the appeal endorsed this argument, and also argued that the trial court possessed
the equitable power to award attornoted above, more recent Indiana decisions state that obduracy giving rise to
an award of attorneys' fees cannot be
based upon prelitigation conduct. See
Kikkert v Krumm (19$*, Ind) 474
NE2d 503. 49 ALR4th 819. and Dolhch v Dotlich (1985, Ind App) 475
NE2d331,bothat J 3.
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neys' fees to put the innocent party
in the same position in which he
would have stood but for the other
party's misconduct, and to discourage repetition of obdurate or badfaith conduct by the other party.
Finding no statutory authority for
the payment of attorneys' fees to
the plaintiff, the court stated that
bad faith or obstinacy on the part
of a party, manifested by its acting
"vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons," had been recognized as an exception to the general rule that attorneys' fees ordinarily would not be recoverable by
the prevailing party. Noting a trial
court finding that the employment
department had^"ScgngfuHy withfiejd" benefits jxomi the plaintiff,
the c o u j ^ 3 ^ ^ ^ ^ Q ^ ^ e n c e t n a t
tne^cle^artment liad acte? in bad
faith or that Its concTuct was "unThe court "cioncluaecnihaT without
such a finding of bad faith it need
not decide whether bad faith would
be recognized as an exception to
the general rule that the parties to
a lawsuit pay their own counsel
fees, and that it would not define
what conduct would constitute bad
faith on the part of the employment compensation department if
such an exception was recognized."
Voiding as a matter of law that
no showing of obduracy sufficient
to justify an award of attorneys'
fees had been made, the court in
Upson v Board of Trustees (1984)
124 NH 787, 474 A2d 582. held
that no attorneys' fees should be
awarded against a state agency that

refused to pay retirement benefits.
The underlying action involved the
plaintiff's entitlement to a disability
retirement. After holding that the
plaintiff was entitled to these benefits, the court examined whether
the plaintiff should be awarded
costs and attorneys' fees due to the
defendant's conduct in refusing to
accept his application. Citing Harkeem v Adams (1977rTl7 NH
6o"7, Mi Aiid 617, above, jhe court
stated that an award gj^attorneys?
lees on the basls~~oTlbac! iaith was

appropriate when;nrgpryiau^rwas
forced to seek ju&Toattssistance to
secure a ^leaxl^delined and estabjJJB^rcSPjft1' ffiflfrevejfl the court
field that in the casebefore it, the
defendant's conduct could not be
characterized as unreasonably obdurate or obstinate. The court additionally distinguished 7 Harkeem
by ndtinjf fJiai_lh<Tllefendani in this
case h a d j Q t jmnexessarjly jn"cj-eas^edtKe^ pja7ntin*w<7sts3by *"e
use^ bt^ilatpry^tactiTs. Vhereiore,
the^~coun Field that it was precluded from finding bad faith sufficient to justify an award of attorneys' fees as a matter of law, but
remanded for a factual determination on the issue.
See State ex rel. Murphy v Industrial Com. of Ohio (1980) 61
Ohio St 2d 312. 15 Ohio Ops 3d
386, 401 NE2d 923, in which the
court held that the party claiming
attorneys' fees under the obduracy
exception had not met his burden
of proof in establishing any improper action by a state commis-

15. The state supreme later held that neys' fees under the obduracy excepsimilar conduct by a state agency could tion. See Harkeem v Adams (1977) 117
properly support an award of attor- NH 687. 377 A2d 617. above.
843
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sion. The state industrial commission had refused to consider an
appeal denying workers' compensation benefits to the appellant. The
Court of Appeals issued a writ of
mandamus ordering the commission to reconsider allowing the appeal, and the appellant sought by
motion an order granting attorneys' fees for the mandamus proceeding. The motion was overruled
by the Court of Appeals. The state
Supreme Court first noted the general rule that attorneys' fees were
not recoverable as part of the costs
of litigation in the absence of statutory authorization. The court further noted, without deciding, that
the appellant attempted to recover
attorneys' fees because the mandamus action was necessitated by
"bad faith, vexatious, wanton, obdurate or oppressive" actions by
the commission. Holding that the
appellant had not borne of his burden of proof, the court refused to
decide whether such actions, if
proven, would result in an award
of attorneys' fees. The judgment
was therefore affirmed.
[bj MUallocating funds
Under the particular facts of the
following case, prelitigation conduct which consisted of misallocating municipal funds was deemed
not fraudulent in purpose, so insufficient to support an award of
attorneys' fees to the plaintiff under the obduracy exception.
Finding no evidence in the record that the defendant had acted in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
obdurately or for oppressive reasons in misallocating municipal
funds, the court in Oakwood v
Makar (1983, Cuyahoga Co) 11

Ohio App 3d 46. 11 Ohio BR 79,
463 NE2d 61, held that an award
of attorneys' fees under the obdurate behavior exception was unwarranted. The underlying action
arose when a state auditor discovered discrepancies in the accounting books of a municipality. The
responsible financial clerk was sued
by the municipality for the financial
deficiencies discovered, and the
plaintiff municipality was awarded
damages and attorneys' fees by the
trial court, which the defendant
appealed. The defendant contended that in the absence of statutory authorization, attorneys' fees
could be awarded only when punitive damages were also awarded.
The court stated that the current
rule of the jurisdiction, as expressed in Sorin v Board of Education (1976) 46 Ohio St 2d 177, 75
Ohio Ops 2d 224, 347 NE2d 527,
§ 4(c], allowed the prevailing party
attorneys' fees if the other party
was found to have acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, obdurately, or for oppressive reasons.
Although punitive damages often
were awarded when these conditions existed, the court found no
precedent stating that an award of
punitive damages must be made
prior to an award of attorneys'
fees. However, the court held that
no express finding had been made
showing that the defendant acted
in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
obdurately, or for oppressive reasons. Viewing the evidence at
showing an informal system of
bookkeeping had existed in the
municipality, and that no formal
accounting procedure had been set
up, the court concluded that the
defendant could be shown to have
no fraudulent purposes in misallo-
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eating the municipal funds. Therefore, the court found the award of
attorneys' fees unwarranted, and
reversed.
See Re Estate of Pitone (1982)
297 Pa Super 161, 443 A2d 349, in
which the appellate court did not
reach the arguments of the appellees that they should be awarded
reasonable counsel fees as part of
taxable costs, because the appellant
was obdurate in misusing estate
funds. The appeal arose after a
petition for reconsideration was
denied by the Orphans' Court. After affirming the lower court denial, the court noted in a footnote
that the appellees requested an
award of reasonable counsel fees
as part of taxable costs under a
state statute allowing such fees as a
sanction against another participant for dilatory, obdurate, or vexatious conduct during the pendency of the matter. According to
the court, the appellees claimed
that the appellant had improperly
used funds of an estate in various
ways. Without discussion, the court
held that the claim for attorneys'
fees had been waived because the
appellees failed to preserve it in
the lowej
tJ Failing to establish legal right
to property before assuming
ownership
^ndeTTnTljarilCUlar lacts of The
following case, the court held that
prelitigation conduct consisting of
a failure to establish legal rights to
property before assuming an
utes of ownership over it cjfa n<
constitute pfrjiirary *t\c,l\ arrant an award of attorneys' fees
under uie^*obduracy exegption^to
Sic American rule!
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Premature usage of a prescriptive easement by a party was held
not the type of obdurate behavior
or bad faith required to award attorneys' fees under the obdurate
behavior exception in Umbreit v
Chester B. Stem, Inc. (1978) 176
Ind App 53, 373 NE2d 1116. The
defendants claimed to have acquired a prescriptive easement
over land belonging to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff sought damages for trespass and an injunction.
The trial court granted the injunction, and awarded attorneys' fees
to the plaintiff. The appellate
court, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the defendants, found that the defendants
had not adequately established the
exact location of their alleged prescriptive easement, nor had they
identified their predecessors-in-title
under whom they claimed continuous use, and that the evidence was
conflicting as to the existence of a
road across the plaintiffs' property
at an earlier time. The court held
that the evidence showed that the
defendants therefore had failed to
meet their burden of proving a
prescriptive easement across the
plaintiff's property before beginning bulldozing activities upon it.
Turning to the question of the
award of attorneys' fees, the court
Jirst noted the general rule of the
jurisdiction that each party paid his
own counsel fees, in the absence of
a statute or agreement or stipulation stating otherwise. The court
listed limited exceptions to the
general rule, including the obdurate behavior exception, which the
court defined as involving the use
of the equitable powers of the
courts to impose costs on defen845

49 ALR4th 825

dants who behaved in bad faith.1*
'An indicator to the appellate court
ftfff "fhe oCduralF behavior exception mignT a^piyTygaTjh> language
<>f uie tiiaj^^^juo^mentTsiLating
tKSff rhT'^o!gfendants had acted
"without any "CPTSTOI" titje/' that
tfie1T*'acts werTj^Shbclciny^to the
conscience ol IthelCoun and evidenced a reckless TcTisriegard _of the
consequences,1' and that attorneys'
tcc^f j i i j £ U Warded as a result,
roweveiv} the appellate court
staretHttat such language is associL atcjJU-wdjh tn^^avTam^o^&unitivV^
'fry^,^atnage^ not^with an awa"rd of
3^ a^WrneyJ) kec0 Noting IKat the
phwhtiffnacrTieither requested at57 torneys' fees in his complaint nor
alluded to them in trial briefs, the
court died St. Joseph's College v
Morrison, Inc. (1973) 158 Ind App
\ 272. 302 NE2d 865, * 4[a], for the
proposition that a party's conduct
must be vexatious and oppressive
in the extreme before attorneys'
fees could be awarded. The court
held that although, thc"~cyidcncc
showed that the_dejencTants had
hot yet "^jp^njeQ^goodl title*To"~the
prescriptive e^se^eliPttrjpestion
wnen they be^aTT^tlTTHozingrThey
lb
n*ad entered a pjrftn'nj^jpurcnase
V
agreement with the "prior owner of

f\
'7,

>

k

16. The court also denned the common fund exception as a defensive use
of the equitable powers of the courts
to ensure that the beneficiaries of litigation share the expense to prevent
the unjust enrichment of "free riders,"
and denned the private attorney general exception as an offensive use of
the equitable powers of the courts to
ensure that a strong congressional policy was effectuated. However, the court
found that neither the common fund
nor the private attorney general exception applied to the case before it.

the easement before taking their
actionX~lmcT~ffad been assured by
the prior owner that the alleged
easement was a means of ingress
and egress from the real estate.
The court also noted that the deed
executed following the purchase
purported to include an easement
along the roadway. Holding that
the defendants might have acted
prematurely and with undue haste,
but that their actions did not rise
to the level of obdurate behavior
or bad faith required by the St.
Joseph's College Case, the court
found no justification for awarding
attorneys* fees to the plaintiff. The
judgment awarding attorneys' fees
was therefore reversed and the
case remanded."
[dj Refusing to enforce sUtutory
rights
Allegations that prelitigation obduracy look the form/of governmental refusals to enforce statutory
rights were not successful in the
following cases, in which the courts
denied recovery of attorneys* fees
requested under the obduracy theory.1*
A request for an award of attorneys' fees made under the theory
17. More recent Indiana decisions
indicate that the jurisdiction will no
longer recognize prelitigation conduct
as a basis for an award of attorneys'
fees under the obduracy exception. See
Kikkert v Krumm (1985. Ind) 474
NE2d 503. 49 ALR4th 819, and Dothch v Dotlich (1985. Ind App) 475
NE2d331.bothat§3.
18. For cases in which government
refusal to pay a monetary claim was
contended to constitute a basis for an
award of attorneys' fees under the obduracy exception, see 4 4(a).

49 AU 4th 825

that a state official obdurately had
refused to enforce statutory rights
was denied without discussion in
Scott v Family Ministries (1976, 2d
Dist) 65 C»J App 3d 492, 135 Cal
Rptr 430. The original action
sought to restrain religious matching in adoption procedures as
practiced by a private state-licensed
adoption agency. After a judgment
restraining the procedures denied
attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs,
they appealed, arguing in part that
the "obdurate attitude" of the state
attorney general in failing to protect the rights of adopted children
entitled them to an award of fees.
The court noted that the same
issue was currently on appeal before the state Supreme Court, and
that therefore it ordinarily would
not pass on the issue until the
Supreme Court had spoken, stating
that extended discussion would be
presumptuous. However, the court
held that attorneys' fees historically
had not been awarded in such situations, so affirmed the trial court
denial of fees.

and handicapped persons. On
cross appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the District Court
should have awarded them attorneys' fees. The court first noted
that the issue of the awarding of
attorneys' fees was a pure question
of law, which could be decided on
appeal by the appellate court.
However, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' claim that the defendants
had acted obdurately and in bad
faith in not complying with the
state statute, stating that this theory involved a factual determination of bad faith. Because the
plaintiffs had not moved for a new
trial on this factual issue, the appellate court held that the issue
was not properly before it. The
district court's order denying attorneys' fees was affirmed."
An award of attorneys' fees as
exemplary damages was held not a
possible recovery for a purported
violation of federal and state statutes in Silverstein v Sisters of
Charity of Leavenworth Health
Services Corp. (1976) 38 Colo App
286, 559 P2d 716, 14 BNA FEP
Cas 1066, 13 CCH EPD 1 11500.
The plaintiff alleged employment
discrimination based on her handicap against the defendant. The
plaintiff* also requested attorneys'
fees as a general prayer in the
complaint. The trial court ordered
the dismissal of the statutory
claims and struck prayers for exemplary damages and fees. On appeal, the plaintiff conceded that
attorneys' fees generally were not
recoverable as an item of damages

The obdurate behavior theory
for an award of attorneys' fees as a
sanction for refusal by school districts to allow the exercise of statutory rights was held to involve a
factual determination of bad faith
properly resolved by the trial court
in Denver Asso. for Retarded Children, Inc. v School Dist. (1975)
188 Colo 310, 535 P2d 200. The
underlying action, a mandamus,
sought to have school districts
comply with a statute concerning
funding for the training of retarded
^
^ N
19. A later Colorado decision takes .See E. F. Hutton & Co. v Anderson
the position that obduracy relates to YI979) 42 Colo App 497. 596 P2d 413,
the prosecution or defense of an action, and not to prelitigation conduct.
847
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in the absence of express contrac- neys' fees under applicable state
tual or statutory liability. However, statutes, and stated the general
she contended that her claim fell rule of the jurisdiction that in the
within either the private attorney absence of a statutory provision
general or obdurate behavior ex- making attorneys' fees a part of
ception to that rule. After rejecting costs, such fees could not be taxed.
recovery under the private attorney However, the court noted that the
general rationale, the court defined petitioners relied upon Sorin v
the obdurate behavior doctrine as Board of Education (1976) 46
including situations in which the Ohio St 2d 177. 347 NE2d 527,
losing party is shown to have acted § 4(e], above, which allowed an
in bad faith or for oppressive rea- award of attorneys' fees to be
sons. The court stated that a re- made when the opposing party has
lated concept allowed an award of demonstrated bad faith or vexaattorneys' fees as exemplary dam- tious, wanton, obdurate, or oppresages to punish behavior of an ag- sive conduct. Stating without disgravated nature. However, because cussion that this exception was not
it determined that no exemplary applicable to the case before it, the
damages could be recovered for a court affirmed the denial of an
purported violation of the federal award of attorneys' fees.
and state discrimination statutes, [e] Terminating contract
the court refused to award fees
Under the particular facts of the
under the obdurate behavior exfollowing case, the court deterception."
mined that prelitigation conduct
The court in State ex rel. Gros- consisting of the termination of a
ser v Boy (1976) 46 Ohio St 2d school superintendent's contract by
184, 347 NE2d 539. held that the a school board would not give rise
obdurate behavior exception to the to an award of attorneys' fees to
American rule would not apply to the superintendent, when the recsanction a party for refusing to ord reflected no bad faith by the
allow the exercise of a nght school board in terminating the
granted by state law. In the under- contract.
lying action, the petitioners sought
The obdurate behavior exception
a writ of mandamus under which
they would be allowed to inspect to the American rule was held not
copies of high school records pur- applicable to award attorneys' fees
suant to a state statute. The peti- incurred by a school superintentioners eventually prevailed and dent during an administrative prosought, by motion in the Court of ceeding he brought after a school
Appeals, an order awarding them board suspended his contract, becosts and expenses, including rea- cause the school board was not
sonable attorneys' fees. The Su- shown to have acted in bad faith in
preme Court found no express seeking to terminate the superinprovision for the recovery of attor- tendent's contract, in Sorin v
20. As noted above, the Colorado
view has been modified since the dale
of this case. See E. F. Hutton & Co. v
•48
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Board of Education (1976) 46
Ohio St 2d 177, 347 NE2d 527.
After the school board asked the
superintendent to resign, brought
charges against him, and then suspended him, the school superintendent demanded a public hearing
under the relevant state statute.
The school board terminated his
contract retroactive to the date of
his suspension after the hearing,
and the Court of Common Pleas,
on appeal, awarded the superintendent his full salary and contract
benefits for the suspension period.
The superintendent then sought
repayment of attorneys' fees incurred during the hearing, and the
trial court awarded attorneys' fees
as costs and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. The state Supreme Court
first noted that the American rule
did not permit a prevailing party to
recover attorneys' fees, in the absence of statutory authorization, as
part of the costs of litigation. Recognizing that commentators had
criticized the American rule in recent years, the court stated that
any departure from the rule, which
it viewed as a deeply ridden policy,
was a matter of legislative concern.
Finding no applicable statutory
provision providing expressly for
the recovery of attorneys' fees as
part of the costs of litigation, and
refusing to read such an award into
a statute governing termination of
contracts with teachers, the court
examined the obduracy exception
to the American rule. This exception, according to the court, would
21. More recent Ohio Supreme
Court decisions have tended to refer to
the exception merely as the "bad faith"
exception, without mentioning the specific terms "obduracy" or "obdurate
behavior." See, for example. State ex

grant an award of attorneys' fees to
a party in actions in which the
opposing party acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, obdurately,
or for oppressive reasons." The
court found that precedent within
the jurisdiction allowed a jury to
consider and include reasonable
attorneys' fees incurred by the
plaintiff as a part of compensatory
damages in tort actions involving
fraud, malice, or insult. However,
the case before it was distinguished
as a lawsuit brought under a specific statutory provision addressing
termination of a contract, as opposed to an action sounding in
tort. Further, the court noted that
the superintendent had not alleged
that the school board acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, obdurately, or for oppressive reasons in
seeking to terminate the contract.
The court noted that neither the
trial court nor the Court of Appeals had held that the school
board acted obdurately, so held
the obdurate behavior exception to
the American rule inapplicable,
and reversed the judgment awarding attorneys' fees.
See Carnegie Financial Corp. v
Akron Nat. Bank 8c Trust Co.
(1976, Summit Co) 49 Ohio App
2d 321, 3 Ohio Ops 3d 387, 361
NE2d 504, in which an award of
attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party was reversed because the record showed no evidence that the
losing party acted obdurately. The
underlying suit concerned the prirel. Kabatek v Stackhouse (1983) 6
Ohio St 3d 55, 6 Ohio BR 73, 451
NE2d 248, and State ex rel. Crockett v
Robinson (1981) 67 Ohio St 2d 363.
21 Ohio Ops 3d 228. 423 NE2d 1099.
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noted that attorneys' fees are not
allowable in the absence of a statute or in the absence of some
agreement or stipulation specifically authorizing such fees, and
noted that the same rule applied in
courts of law and courts of equity.
However, the court recognized that
other jurisdictions had carved out
an exception to the general rule
through the use of the court's equitable powers when a party acted
in bad faith. Stating that the case
represented the first time the court
had considered the obdurate behavior exception to the American
rule, the court defined the obdurate behavior exception as a protective measure which operates to
help preserve the integrity of the
judicial process. An attorney's fee 4
III. Obduracy in conduct of trial award made under the obdurate 1
behavior exception, according to I
litigation
the court, was punitive in nature 1
§ 5. Prosecuting suit; baseless and designed to reimburse a pre- 1
claim
vailing party who has been dragged I
The courts in the cases following into baseless litigation and as a I
recognized the appropriateness of consequence subjected tojgrej^jjtaJ
regard of attorneys' fees under the
obduracy exception to sanction a thaTtheobdurate behavior excep- '
plaintiff bringing a meritless suit,] tion came into play only at the
holding that the exception pro-! time a party files a knowingly base- j
vided a remedy (or a defendant! less claim or at the time a party /
brought into baseless litigation.
1 discovers that the claim is baseless I
In holding that attorneys' feesl and fails to dismiss it. The court
could not be awarded under the! 1 stated that conduct such as this)
obduracy exception for prelitiga-l w n u l d c o n s t i t u t e o f r f h i r ^ ^ h e h a v t r f r
tion conduct forming the basis of \ipuil klnal court s hndingthat the
the lawsuit, the court in Kikkert v behavior was vexatious and oppresKrumm (1985, Ind) 474 NE2d 503, sive in the extreme and a "blatant
49 ALR4th 819 (for a fuller dis- abuse of the judicial process." Decussion of the facts underlying the scribing the underlying^awsuji^as
lawsuit as evidence of obduracy, arL^Kample of the^Tassic^^perty^
Qspujjxyand stating its belief that
see $ 3), stated that an award of
thlrTrtauuifTs and defendants disattorneys* fees toja prevailing party puted aftlegitimjW claim of right,
is'jn thejature of_a igmgdy-for^a the court found tn4 obdurate be^^paTtyjrfrffittg^
havior exception, as\a remedy for
tion. Tn^jfrate Supreme Court first
ority of Hens on automobiles. The
bank that financed the purchase of
the automobiles was ordered by
the trial court to pay damages and
attorneys' fees to purchasers of the
automobiles. Both holdings were
reversed on appeal. Stating that
attorneys' fees could be awarded
only under a specific statutory provision or under the circumstances
of bad faith or obduracy as stated
by the court in Sorin v Board of
Education (1976) 46 Ohio St 2d
177, 75 Ohio Ops\2d 224. 347
NE2d 527, above, the court held
that because neither exception had
been argued at the trial court or
on appeal, attorneys' fees were not
recoverable as damages.

defendants who are dragged into
baseless litigation, inapplicable.

the judgment. After holding that
the trial court had the discretion to
The court in Dotlich v Dotlich award attorneys' fees against both
(1985, Ind App) 475 NE2d 331, the plaintiff and his attorneys, the
held that the obdurate behavior court noted that as a general rule,
exception to the American rule attorneys' fees were not awarded
against shifting of attorneys' fees within the jurisdiction in the abprovided a remedy for defendants sence of a contractual agreement
dragged into baseless litigation, or statute. The court stated, howbut was not available to a corpora- ever, that exceptions to this rule
tion that essentially prosecuted an had been carved out in recent
action. - Relying upon Kikkert v years, one of which was the obduKrumm (1985. Ind) 474 NE2d 503, rate behavior exception. This exabove, for the proposition that the ception was defined as operable in
exception provides a remedy for a situations in which the prevailing
defendant dragged into_Jaaseless party has been dragged into baseklitijpiMnr, the court recognized that less litigation by the bad faith of
I the exception could be utilized to Ithe losing party. Though holding
I award fees to a defendant under 'that the state tort claims act proI appropriate circumstances, though vided a proper basis for the award
it was not available to award attor- of attorneys' fees in the case before
I neys' fees to a party that prose- it, the court stated that even if the
statute did not apply, the obdurate
\cuted an action.
behavior exception would. Because
An action forjal^»-tty|pp^nnpp>nf
tfiejtrial^otmjn^dea
filed against a state judge which ing that IKe^pjajr^^
was found by the trial court to be "frlvolousT uTTr^ionaoTe and
"frivolous, unreasonable and grouTfcIIelSrs^^
groundless" provided a proper ba- unTrjnTestecj Dy^jrTe^pIalnTn^who
sis for an award of attorneys' fees "Offered ricT>e^icIe7iceor^bbjections
under the obdurate behavior exception, according to the court in tne court "helcT thaT an award of
Owen v Vaughn (1985, Ind App) attorneys' fees under the obdurate
479 NE2d 83. The plaintiff was behavior exception would be
jailed for contempt by the judge, proper. The judgment was afand later sued the judge for false firmed.
imprisonment. The trial court en•
tered summary judgment for the
Based upon the particular facts
judge and awarded attorneys' fees of the following cases, the courts
against the plaintiffs attorneys un- determined that an award of attorder the provisions of a state tort neys' fees could not be recovered
claims statute. The award of attor- under the theory that the opposing
neys' fees was later amended to party prosecuted the lawsuit based
make both the plaintiff and his upon meritless or groundless
attorneys liable for the fees under claims.
22. For the court's discussion of
preliiigation conduct as obduracy and

a fuller discussion of the underlying
facts, see 9 3.
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